\u00abSobre la Apolog\u00eda de S\u00f3crates y el Crit\u00f3n de Plat\u00f3n\u00bb \/ II<\/span><\/p>\n Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d (1899-1973)<\/span><\/p>\n \u0112RVD\u012aTI\u014cRIBVS <\/span>***<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n Tanto el contenido como el estilo de los discursos de las Leyes impiden que S\u00f3crates escuche cualquier otro discurso y, en particular, lo que <\/span>Crit\u00f3n<\/span><\/a> podr\u00eda llegar a decir. Pero este no tiene nada m\u00e1s que decir: el discurso de las Leyes lo ha convencido por completo. Entonces, concluye S\u00f3crates, <\/span>actuemos<\/span> de esa manera, puesto que el dios nos conduce por ese camino. La voz de las Leyes parece ser la voz de los dioses.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Los hechos son m\u00e1s veros\u00edmiles que los discursos: <\/span>S\u00f3crates <\/span>permaneci\u00f3 en prisi\u00f3n, decidi\u00f3 quedarse, ten\u00eda <\/span>un \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 (<\/span>logos<\/i><\/span>) que le dec\u00eda que lo<\/span> hiciera. Pero, \u00bfes ese \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 (<\/span>logos<\/i><\/span>) id\u00e9ntico al \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 (<\/span>logos<\/i><\/span>) mediante el cual convence a Crit\u00f3n? Hemos indicado por qu\u00e9 esto no es probable. Hay, entonces, dos <\/span>\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 <\/span>(<\/span>l<\/i><\/span>ogoi<\/i><\/span>)<\/span> diferentes <\/span>diferentes <\/span>que llevan a la misma conclusi\u00f3n. El \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 (<\/span>logos<\/i><\/span>) que convence a S\u00f3crates no convencer\u00eda a Crit\u00f3n, y viceversa. Crit\u00f3n se preocupa sobre todo por lo que dir\u00eda el pueblo de Atenas si \u00e9l no ayudara a S\u00f3crates a huir de la prisi\u00f3n: lo que S\u00f3crates le diga a Crit\u00f3n, este puede dec\u00edrselo a la gente y as\u00ed lo har\u00e1.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Hobbes<\/span><\/a> cometi\u00f3 una grave exageraci\u00f3n cuando acus\u00f3 de arquistas a S\u00f3crates y sus seguidores. La verdad suby<\/span>acente en esa exageraci\u00f3n es el hecho de que S\u00f3crates no cre\u00eda que pudiera existir un deber<\/span> irrestricto de acatar las leyes. Pero esto no le impidi\u00f3 pensar \u2014<\/span>m<\/span>\u00e1s a\u00fan, le permiti\u00f3 pensar\u2014 que la exigencia de ese tipo de obediencia es una regla emp\u00edrica sensata, a diferencia de una ley incondic<\/span>ional<\/span>mente v\u00e1lida.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Redde ad prius caput<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad initium paginae huius<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad indicem<\/a><\/p>\n Both the content and the manner of the speeches of the Laws make it impossible for Socrates to listen to any other speeches and in particular to what Kriton<\/a> might say. But Kriton has nothing else to say: the speech of the Laws has entirely convinced him. Then, Socrates concludes, let us act in this way since it is in this way that the god leads. The voice of the Laws seems to be the voice of the gods.<\/span><\/p>\n Deeds are more trustworthy than speeches: Socrates did stay in prison, he chose to stay, he had a \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 (logos<\/i>) telling him to stay. But is this a \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 (logos<\/i>) identical with the \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 (logos<\/i>) by which he persuades Kriton? We have indicated why this is not likely. There are then two different \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9 (l<\/i>ogoi<\/i>) leading to the same conclusion. The a \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 (logos<\/i>) which convinces Socrates would not convince Kriton and viceversa. Kriton is concerned above all with what the people of Athens will say if he has not helped Socrates to escape from prison: what Socrates tells Kriton, Kriton can and will tell the people.<\/span><\/p>\n Hobbes<\/span><\/a> committed a grave exaggeration when he accused Socrates and his followers of being anarchists. The truth underlying that exaggeration <\/span>is <\/span>the fact that Socrates did not think that there could be an unqualified duty to obey the laws. But this did not prevent him from thinking, nay, it enabled him to think that the demand for such obedience is a wise rule of thumb as distinguished from an unqualifiedly valid law.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Redde ad prius caput<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad initium paginae huius<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad indicem<\/a><\/p>\n El texto en lengua inglesa fue publicado de manera p\u00f3stuma en un volumen en honor al prof. Jacob Klein: Essais in Honor of Jacob Klein<\/em> (Annapol\u012b, \u0113 Typographe\u014d Acad\u0113m\u012bae S\u0101nct\u012b I\u014dhannis MCMLXXVI). Aunque nosotros tomamos como base lo aparecido en una antolog\u00eda dedicada a escritos del prof. Str\u016bthi\u014d en ingl\u00e9s en 1983: Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy<\/em> (Sicag\u012b, \u0113 Typographe\u014d \u016aniversit\u0101tis Sicag\u012b MCMLXXXIII). La versi\u00f3n castellana es obra de Aemilia Aquad\u012bs, aparecida en la traducci\u00f3n del volumen mencionado anteriormente (Bon\u0101eropol\u012b, \u0113 Typographe\u014d Am\u014drrort\u012b MMVIII). La publicaci\u00f3n de estos fragmentos promueve la difusi\u00f3n en castellano de la obra del profesor Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d con fines acad\u00e9micos y de formaci\u00f3n. Conminamos a visitar su biblioteca m\u00e1s cercana o adquirir el volumen f\u00edsico en su librer\u00eda de confianza.<\/span><\/p>\n Redde ad prius caput<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad initium paginae huius<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/atriumphilosophicum.es\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/Leo_Strauss_USA_1939-239x300.jpg\")
<\/span><\/p>\nVersi\u014d hisp\u0101nica Aemili\u0101 Aquad\u012bt\u012b auctr\u012bce 41<\/span><\/h1>\n
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<\/a><\/p>\nLe\u014dnard\u012b Str\u016bthi\u014dnis verba 41<\/span><\/h1>\n
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<\/a><\/p>\nI\u016bra<\/span><\/h1>\n
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