\u00abSobre la Apolog\u00eda de S\u00f3crates y el Crit\u00f3n de Plat\u00f3n\u00bb \/ II<\/span><\/p>\n Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d (1899-1973)<\/span><\/p>\n \u0112RVD\u012aTI\u014cRIBVS <\/span>***<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n De hecho, ning\u00fan ateniense, contin\u00faan las Leyes, hizo un acuerdo con ellas en un grado tan singular como <\/span>S\u00f3crates, que casi nunca abandon\u00f3 Atenas y nunca dese\u00f3 siquiera conocer <\/span>otra ciudad u otras leyes: le bastaron las Leyes y la ciudad; mostr\u00f3 con hechos que la ciudad le agradaba. Este razonamiento de las Leyes puede explicar por qu\u00e9 guardan silencio respecto del hecho de que S\u00f3crates nunca intentara convencerlas de cambiar su curso, aunque sab\u00eda que eran deficientes al menos en un aspecto importante <\/span>(<\/span>Apolog\u00eda de S\u00f3crates<\/i><\/span>, <\/span>37a7-b1<\/span><\/a>), <\/span>porque no podr\u00eda haberlo hecho sin <\/span>entrar en<\/span> la actividad pol\u00edtica y, como sin duda las Leyes lo <\/span>sab\u00edan,<\/span> su <\/span>daimonion<\/i><\/span> (<\/span>\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd<\/span>)<\/span> se lo imped\u00eda (<\/span>ibid<\/i><\/span>., <\/span>31c4-e6<\/span><\/a>); las Leyes callan sobre este punto, porque explicar qu\u00e9 significa <\/span>persuadirlas <\/span>no ser\u00eda compatible con la <\/span>hip\u00f3tesis<\/i><\/span> de su <\/span>condici\u00f3n<\/span> sobrehumana. De todos modos, en el caso de S\u00f3crates, el deber de obedecerlas no estaba limitado por el derecho a persuadirlas. Este hecho refuerza el argumento de las <\/span>Leyes de que, <\/span>al tratar de huir, \u00e9l actuar\u00eda en contra de su <\/span>t\u00e1cito <\/span>acuerdo con ellas y, en consecuencia, cometer\u00eda un acto injusto; ahora, las Leyes guardan silencio sobre la otra <\/span>raz\u00f3n <\/span>para obedecerlas. <\/span>Terminan esta <\/span>parte de su <\/span>argumento al preguntarle a S\u00f3crates <\/span>si consiente en vivir como ciudadano de acuerdo con ellas. Ante una pregunta de <\/span>S\u00f3crates, <\/span>Crit\u00f3n<\/span><\/a> responde que, para ambos, es necesario estar de acuerdo con lo que dicen las Leyes.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Las Leyes concluyen su razonamiento acerca de la <\/span>justicia <\/span>de la huida de S\u00f3crates volviendo a hacer hincapi\u00e9 en que, si este huyera, quebrantar\u00eda sus pactos con ellas \u2014que suscribi\u00f3 sin que mediara compulsi\u00f3n ninguna y que, por ende, eran justos <\/span>(<\/span>no dicen que ellas mismas lo fueran<\/span>)\u2014 <\/span>y en que las leyes le complac\u00edan. Este \u00faltimo hecho es tanto m\u00e1s notable cuanto que, como lo mencionan ahora, S\u00f3crates ten\u00eda la costumbre de decir que Esparta y Creta estaban bien gobernadas o ten\u00edan buenas leyes (opini\u00f3n que, al <\/span>parecer, <\/span>no ten\u00eda de Atenas); aunque no sent\u00eda deseos de <\/span>conocer <\/span>otras ciudades y otras leyes, conoc\u00eda al menos algunas de ellas. El hecho de que no saliera casi nunca de Atenas prueba que la ciudad le agradaba y, por lo tanto, tambi\u00e9n las Leyes; porque, \u00bfa qui\u00e9n podr\u00eda gustarle una ciudad sin <\/span>leyes? <\/span>El hecho de que ninguna ciudad sin leyes pueda <\/span>agradar no prueba, <\/span>como es obvio, que una ciudad agradable <\/span>deba <\/span>tener leyes agradables: una ciudad puede tener otros atractivos, al margen de sus leyes; esto es lo que quer\u00eda <\/span>decir<\/span> S\u00f3crates al hacer que las Leyes insistieran en que <\/span>ninguna <\/span>ley<\/i><\/span> le imped\u00eda mudarse a otra ciudad. (Se puede hallar una larga exposici\u00f3n de la opini\u00f3n de S\u00f3crates sobre los atractivos de Atenas y sus leyes en su descripci\u00f3n de la <\/span>democracia, en el <\/span>octavo libro de la <\/span>Rep\u00fablica<\/i><\/span>.)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Perge ad sequ\u0113ns caput<\/a><\/p>\n Redde ad prius caput<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad initium paginae huius<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad indicem<\/a><\/p>\n No Athenian, the Laws continue, made the agreement with the Laws in deed to such a singular degree as Socrates, for he hardly ever left Athens, he never even desired to know another city or other laws but the Laws and the city sufficed him; he showed by deed that the city pleased him. This reasoning of the Laws may explain why they are silent on Socrates\u2019 ever having attempted to persuade the Laws to change their course although he knew that they were defective in at least one important respect (Apology of Socrates<\/i> 37a7-b1<\/a>), for he could not have done this without engaging in political activity and, as the Laws doubtless knew, his daimonion<\/i> (\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd) prevented this (ib<\/i>. 31c4-e6<\/a>); the Laws are silent on this point because spelling out what persuading the Laws means would not be compatible with the hypothesis<\/i> of their superhuman status. In the case of Socrates at any rate the duty of obeying the Laws was not limited by the right to persuade the Laws. This fact strengthens their contention that by trying to run away he would act against his tacit agreement with them and hence commit an unjust act; they are now silent on the other ground of obedience to them. They conclude this part of their argument by asking Socrates whether he has agreed to live as a citizen according to them. Kriton<\/a>, asked by Socrates, replies that it is necessary for him and Socrates to agree to what the Laws say.<\/span><\/p>\n The Laws conclude their reasoning about the justice of Socrates\u2019 running away by emphasizing again that in doing so he would break his covenants with them \u2014covenants into which he entered under no compulsion whatever and which therefore were just\u2014they do not say that the Laws themselves are just\u2014and that he was pleased with the laws. The latter fact is all the more remarkable since, as they mention now, he was in the habit of saying of Sparta and Crete (what he apparently did not say of Athens) that they are well-governed or have good laws; although he had no desire to know other cities and other laws, he nevertheless knew at least some of them. His hardly ever leaving Athens proves that the city pleases him and hence the Laws: for whom could a city without laws please? That no city which has no laws can please obviously does not prove that the pleasing city must have pleasing laws: a city may have other attractions than its laws; this is what Socrates meant when he made the Laws emphasize that no law<\/i> prevented him from moving to another city. (One finds an extensive statement of Socrates\u2019 view of Athens\u2019 attractions and of her laws in his description of the democracy in the eighth book of the Republic<\/i>.)<\/span><\/p>\n Perge ad sequ\u0113ns caput<\/a><\/p>\n Redde ad prius caput<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad initium paginae huius<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad indicem<\/a><\/p>\n El texto en lengua inglesa fue publicado de manera p\u00f3stuma en un volumen en honor al prof. Jacob Klein: Essais in Honor of Jacob Klein<\/em> (Annapol\u012b, \u0113 Typographe\u014d Acad\u0113m\u012bae S\u0101nct\u012b I\u014dhannis MCMLXXVI). Aunque nosotros tomamos como base lo aparecido en una antolog\u00eda dedicada a escritos del prof. Str\u016bthi\u014d en ingl\u00e9s en 1983: Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy<\/em> (Sicag\u012b, \u0113 Typographe\u014d \u016aniversit\u0101tis Sicag\u012b MCMLXXXIII). La versi\u00f3n castellana es obra de Aemilia Aquad\u012bs, aparecida en la traducci\u00f3n del volumen mencionado anteriormente (Bon\u0101eropol\u012b, \u0113 Typographe\u014d Am\u014drrort\u012b MMVIII). La publicaci\u00f3n de estos fragmentos promueve la difusi\u00f3n en castellano de la obra del profesor Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d con fines acad\u00e9micos y de formaci\u00f3n. Conminamos a visitar su biblioteca m\u00e1s cercana o adquirir el volumen f\u00edsico en su librer\u00eda de confianza.<\/span><\/p>\n Perge ad sequ\u0113ns caput<\/a><\/p>\n Redde ad prius caput<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad initium paginae huius<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/atriumphilosophicum.es\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/Leo_Strauss_USA_1939-239x300.jpg\")
<\/span><\/p>\nVersi\u014d hisp\u0101nica Aemili\u0101 Aquad\u012bt\u012b auctr\u012bce 38<\/span><\/h1>\n
Le\u014dnard\u012b Str\u016bthi\u014dnis verba 38<\/span><\/h1>\n
I\u016bra<\/span><\/h1>\n
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