\u00abSobre la Apolog\u00eda de S\u00f3crates y el Crit\u00f3n de Plat\u00f3n\u00bb \/ I<\/span><\/p>\n Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d (1899-1973)<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u0112RVD\u012aTI\u014cRIBVS<\/span> ***<\/a><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n S\u00f3crates considera que el dios ha dicho que \u00e9l, S\u00f3crates, es el m\u00e1s sabio. Como es natural, cree en la veracidad del dios, por no hablar de su conocimiento o su sabidur\u00eda. Por otra parte, est\u00e1 seguro de que \u00e9l, S\u00f3crates, no es en modo alguno sabio. Para resolver el acertijo, emprende cierto tipo de indagaci\u00f3n. Examina a las personas que \u00e9l u otros consideran sabias. Al examinarlas, tambi\u00e9n examina, sin duda, al dios: trata de refutar al or\u00e1culo. Descubre que, si bien las personas a las que interroga creen poseer conocimiento, en realidad carecen de \u00e9l, mientras que S\u00f3crates no crey\u00f3 ni cree saber nada digno de menci\u00f3n sobre las cosas m\u00e1s importantes. De este modo llega a ver la verdad del or\u00e1culo: su intento de refutar al dios se convierte en ayuda al dios y un sincero servicio a \u00e9l. S\u00f3crates examina a los pol\u00edticos, a los poetas, cuya \u00absabidur\u00eda\u00bb no parece ser diferente de la de los profetas y de quienes profieren or\u00e1culos, y a los artesanos. No dice en forma expl\u00edcita que ha examinado a los agricultores (quiz\u00e1 estos no pretenden ser sabios; cf. Jenofonte, Econ\u00f3mico<\/em>, 15), a los caballeros que se ocupan de sus propios asuntos, o a los sofistas (y los fisi\u00f3logos<\/a>). Su examen de los hombres considerados sabios, y en especial de los pol\u00edticos, lleva a estos a odiarlo intensamente, y esa inquina est\u00e1 en el fondo de la calumnia a la que ha estado expuesto durante largo tiempo. La gente lo llama sabio de manera calumniosa, porque quienes presenciaron su examen de los llamados o supuestos sabios cre\u00edan en su sabidur\u00eda respecto de las cosas muy importantes sobre las cuales examinaba a los dem\u00e1s. Pero esto es un total malentendido: S\u00f3crates s\u00f3lo es sabio en el sentido de que sabe que nada sabe. Y este es el significado del enigm\u00e1tico or\u00e1culo relativo a \u00e9l: la sabidur\u00eda humana tiene poca o ninguna importancia, mas el ser humano que la posea, como S\u00f3crates, es el mayor de los sabios. El dios muestra que \u00e9l mismo, el dios, es verdaderamente sabio, al insinuar la verdad acerca del valor o, m\u00e1s bien, la falta de valor de la sabidur\u00eda humana y su contenido puramente negativo.<\/span><\/p>\n La animosidad contra S\u00f3crates se agrav\u00f3 y tuvo oportunidad de ventilarse porque los j\u00f3venes que lo acompa\u00f1aban disfrutaban al escuchar su examen de los seres humanos e incluso sol\u00edan imitarlo. Entonces, los as\u00ed examinados se encolerizaron contra \u00e9l, no contra ellos, y dijeron que S\u00f3crates corromp\u00eda a los j\u00f3venes. (A la luz del hecho de que lo particularmente agravante era lo que hac\u00edan los j\u00f3venes seguidores de S\u00f3crates, y que se dedicaran a su irritante pasatiempo en ausencia de este, es comprensible que S\u00f3crates ni siquiera conociera los nombres de los primeros acusadores, aunque s\u00ed, al menos, los de algunos de los examinados por \u00e9l mismo; cf. 18c8-d1<\/a> con 21c3<\/a>). Como es obvio que esta calumnia no basta, afirman que corrompe a los j\u00f3venes al hacer y ense\u00f1ar las cosas por las cuales de ordinario se censura a todos los que filosofan, a saber, \u00ablas cosas de lo alto y de abajo de la tierra\u00bb, \u00abno creer en los dioses\u00bb y \u00abhacer del discurso m\u00e1s d\u00e9bil el m\u00e1s fuerte\u00bb. La \u00abno creencia en los dioses\u00bb hab\u00eda sido presentada anteriormente por S\u00f3crates como una inferencia de quienes escuchaban a los primeros acusadores y, por lo tanto, estaba a\u00fan menos confirmada por pruebas que las otras dos acusaciones. Pero S\u00f3crates hizo esto antes de hablar del or\u00e1culo de Delfos. Mientras tanto, ha mostrado que toda la sabidur\u00eda que posee es producto de ese or\u00e1culo, es decir, que no hay una sabidur\u00eda pred\u00e9lfica y, por consiguiente, ya no es necesario distinguir entre physiologia<\/em> y ate\u00edsmo. En otras palabras, ha demostrado que la acusaci\u00f3n primaria se relaciona con la corrupci\u00f3n de los j\u00f3venes y que los otros tres cargos son pura invenci\u00f3n, concebidos para dar alguna verosimilitud a la acusaci\u00f3n de corrupci\u00f3n; en consecuencia, ya no hay necesidad alguna de asignar una jerarqu\u00eda diferente a la acusaci\u00f3n de impiedad, por una parte, y a las dos restantes, por la otra. S\u00f3crates ha demostrado tambi\u00e9n que no s\u00f3lo es odiado por aquellos a quienes refuta, sino tambi\u00e9n por muchos de los que est\u00e1n presentes en la refutaci\u00f3n (21d1<\/a>; cf. 23a4<\/a>), pues los oyentes creen, al igual que los examinados por \u00e9l, conocer la verdad acerca de las cosas m\u00e1s importantes; la distinci\u00f3n entre los primeros acusadores y los oyentes se desvanece: pr\u00e1cticamente todos los atenienses son los primeros acusadores. Y los acusadores actuales son meros portavoces de los llamados primeros acusadores (24b7<\/a>).<\/span><\/p>\n Perge ad sequ\u0113ns caput<\/a><\/p>\n Redde ad prius caput<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad initium paginae huius<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad indicem<\/a><\/p>\n Socrates understood the god to have said that Socrates is most wise. He naturally believed in the god\u2019s veracity, to say nothing of his knowledge, or wisdom. On the other hand he was sure that he, Socrates, was not at all wise. To solve the riddle he engaged in a certain kind of inquiry. He examined the people thought by him or by others to be wise. In examining them he examined indeed also the god: he tried to refute the oracle. He found out that while the people questioned by him believed that they possessed knowledge, they lacked it, whereas Socrates did and does not believe that he knows anything worthwhile of the most important things. He thus came to see the truth of the oracle: his attempt to refute the god turned into assistance to the god and whole-hearted service to him. Socrates examined the politicians, the poets whose \u201cwisdom\u201d does not appear to be different from that of the prophets and of those who delivered oracles, and the craftsmen. He does not say explicitly that he examined the farmers (perhaps farmers did not claim to be wise\u2014cf. Xenophon, Oeconomicus<\/em> 15), the gentlemen who mind their own business, or the sophists (and physiologists<\/em><\/a>). His examination of the men believed to be wise, and especially of the politicians, aroused very deep hatred of him, and that hatred is at the bottom of the slander to which he has been exposed for a long time. People slanderously call him wise because those present at his examination of the so-called or would-be wise believed that he was wise regarding the most important things regarding which he examines the others. But this is a complete misunderstanding: Socrates is wise only in the sense that he knows that he knows nothing. And this is the meaning of the enigmatic oracle regarding Socrates: human wisdom is of little or no account, but a human being who possesses it, as Socrates does, is most wise. The god shows that he, the god, is truly wise by hinting at the truth about the worth or rather worthlessness of human wisdom and its purely negative content.<\/span><\/p>\n The animosity against Socrates was aggravated and acquired an opportunity to vent itself because the young men who accompany him enjoy listening to his examination of human beings and even frequently imitate him. Thereupon those examined by the young are angry at Socrates, not at themselves, and say that Socrates corrupts the young. (In the light of the facts that what was particularly aggravating was what Socrates\u2019 young followers did and that they engaged in their irritating pastime in his absence, it is understandable that he does not even know the names of the first accusers, although he knows the names of at least some whom he himself examined; cf. 18c8<\/a>-d1 with 21c3<\/a>.) Since this slander is obviously not sufficient, they say that he corrupts the young by doing and teaching the things for which all who philosophize are commonly blamed, namely, \u201cthe things aloft and beneath the earth,\u201d \u201cnot believing in gods\u201d and \u201crendering the weaker speech the stronger.\u201d \u201cNot believing in gods\u201d had previously been presented by Socrates as an inference on the part of those who listen to the first accusers and therefore as even less borne out by evidence than the two other charges. But this he did before speaking of the Delphic oracle. In the meantime he has shown that whatever wisdom he possesses was elicited by the Delphic oracle, i.e., that there was no pre-Delphic wisdom and hence there is no need any more for distinguishing between physiologia and atheism. In other words, he has shown that the primary charge concerns his corruption of the young and that the other three charges are pure inventions thought out in order to give some plausibility to the corruption charge; hence there is no longer any need for assigning a different status to the impiety charge on the one hand and the other two charges on the other. Socrates has also shown that he is hated not only by those whom he refutes but also by many of those who are present at the refutation (21d1<\/a>; cf. 23a4<\/a>); for the listeners believe that they know the truth about the most important things no less than those whom he examines; the distinction between the first accusers and the listeners breaks down: practically all Athenians are the first accusers. And the present accusers are merely the spokesmen for the so-called first accusers (24b7<\/a>).<\/span><\/p>\n Perge ad sequ\u0113ns caput<\/a><\/p>\n Redde ad prius caput<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad initium paginae huius<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad indicem<\/a><\/p>\n El texto en lengua inglesa fue publicado de manera p\u00f3stuma en un volumen en honor al prof. Jacob Klein: Essais in Honor of Jacob Klein<\/em> (Annapol\u012b, \u0113 Typographe\u014d Acad\u0113m\u012bae S\u0101nct\u012b I\u014dhannis MCMLXXVI). Aunque nosotros tomamos como base lo aparecido en una antolog\u00eda dedicada a escritos del prof. Str\u016bthi\u014d en ingl\u00e9s en 1983: Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy<\/em> (Sicag\u012b, \u0113 Typographe\u014d \u016aniversit\u0101tis Sicag\u012b MCMLXXXIII). La versi\u00f3n castellana es obra de Aemilia Aquad\u012bs, aparecida en la traducci\u00f3n del volumen mencionado anteriormente (Bon\u0101eropol\u012b, \u0113 Typographe\u014d Am\u014drrort\u012b MMVIII). La publicaci\u00f3n de estos fragmentos promueve la difusi\u00f3n en castellano de la obra del profesor Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d con fines acad\u00e9micos y de formaci\u00f3n. Conminamos a visitar su biblioteca m\u00e1s cercana o adquirir el volumen f\u00edsico en su librer\u00eda de confianza.<\/span><\/p>\n Perge ad sequ\u0113ns caput<\/a><\/p>\n Redde ad prius caput<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad initium paginae huius<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/atriumphilosophicum.es\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/Leo_Strauss_USA_1939-239x300.jpg\")
<\/p>\nVersi\u014d hisp\u0101nica Aemili\u0101 Aquad\u012bt\u012b auctr\u012bce 6<\/span><\/h1>\n
Le\u014dnard\u012b Str\u016bthi\u014dnis verba 6<\/span><\/h1>\n
I\u016bra<\/span><\/h1>\n
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