\u00abSobre la Apolog\u00eda de S\u00f3crates y el Crit\u00f3n de Plat\u00f3n\u00bb \/ I<\/span><\/p>\n Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d (1899-1973)<\/span><\/p>\n \u0112RVD\u012aTI\u014cRIBVS <\/span>***<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n La refutaci\u00f3n socr\u00e1tica del cargo que le hacen los primeros acusadores es tan completa, tan devastadora, que en cierto sentido se vuelve ininteligible. S\u00f3crates atribuye a \u00abuno de ustedes\u00bb palabras que quiz\u00e1 podr\u00eda replicar y decir: si no haces nada m\u00e1s fuera de lo com\u00fan que los otros, \u00bfc\u00f3mo puede ser que te hayan calumniado de tan extraordinaria manera? \u00bfNo debe haber alg\u00fan fuego donde hay tanto humo? La r\u00e9plica es justa y S\u00f3crates tratar\u00e1 de mostrar al jurado c\u00f3mo se ha convertido en blanco de esa difamaci\u00f3n. Sabe que, al dar su explicaci\u00f3n, parecer\u00e1 mofarse de parte dela audiencia; sin embargo, contar\u00e1 toda la verdad a todos los espectadores. Tiene alg\u00fan tipo de sabidur\u00eda, un tipo que es quiz\u00e1 sabidur\u00eda humana, a diferencia de la sabidur\u00eda sobrehumana de los sofistas (y de los fisi\u00f3logos<\/em><\/a>). Sabe que, por lo que va a decir, podr\u00eda suponerse que alardea (y por ello, que bromea de manera involuntaria), puesto que el discurso que pronunciar\u00e1 no le pertenece, sino que puede adjudicarlo a un orador que resulta confiable para el auditorio. Ese orador es el dios<\/a> de Delfos<\/a> o, m\u00e1s precisamente, Querefonte<\/a>, quien era su camarada desde la juventud y tambi\u00e9n (cosa que S\u00f3crates no pod\u00eda decir de s\u00ed mismo) un camarada de la multitud, un s\u00f3lido dem\u00f3crata y, en consecuencia, digno de confianza para el auditorio. Como es p\u00fablico, Querefonte era impetuoso y, consecuentemente, en uno de sus viajes a Delfos se atrevi\u00f3 a preguntar al or\u00e1culo si hab\u00eda alguien m\u00e1s sabio que S\u00f3crates. La Pitia<\/a> respondi\u00f3 que nadie era m\u00e1s sabio. La verdad de esta historia no est\u00e1 garantizada por el dios ni por la Pitia, y ni siquiera por Querefonte, que ya no vive, que ya no vive, sino por su hermano. La historia del or\u00e1culo de Delfos es nueva para el auditorio, al igual que la contada por S\u00f3crates poco antes, respecto de Calias<\/a> y \u00c9veno (20a-2-c1<\/a>).<\/span><\/p>\n La pregunta de Querefonte presupone que consideraba sabio a S\u00f3crates, singularmente sabio, antes de consultar al or\u00e1culo. Esa sabidur\u00eda de S\u00f3crates no ten\u00eda nada que ver en absoluto con la sabidur\u00eda que descubri\u00f3 o adquiri\u00f3 como consecuencia de la respuesta d\u00e9lfica. Era pred\u00e9lfica. A la luz de su sabidur\u00eda posd\u00e9lfica, su sabidur\u00eda pred\u00e9lfica pod\u00eda ser pura locura, pero la pose\u00eda o lo pose\u00eda. S\u00f3crates guarda completo silencio al respecto en su defensa ante el jurado. Da un indicio sobre su car\u00e1cter al referirse a Las nubes<\/em>, donde se presenta a Querefonte como el compa\u00f1ero de S\u00f3crates por excelencia. Pero S\u00f3crates muestra a Querefonte como un piadoso creyente en el or\u00e1culo de Delfos; su piedad refuerza la creencia en la piedad de su reverenciado maestro. \u00bfO acaso su consulta al or\u00e1culo podr\u00eda haber tenido un motivo no piadoso? No se nos dice por qu\u00e9 consult\u00f3 al or\u00e1culo. Su pregunta no est\u00e1 libre de ambig\u00fcedad: \u00bfhay alguien \u2014hombre o dios\u2014 m\u00e1s sabio que S\u00f3crates? La respuesta de la Pitia no elimina esta ambig\u00fcedad.<\/span><\/p>\n Sobre el t\u00e9rmino \u00abphysiologia\u00bb,<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n En relaci\u00f3n a este particular t\u00e9rmino, en la sesi\u00f3n 1 (del 18 de octubre de 1966 en la Universidad de Chicago), el profesor Str\u016bthi\u014d clarific\u00f3: \u00ab[\u2026] la presuposici\u00f3n crucial de la filosof\u00eda pol\u00edtica cl\u00e1sica era, como habr\u00e1n observado, la existencia de fines naturales del ser humano que siguen un orden natural. En otras palabras, no hay un caos de fines, sino una jerarqu\u00eda de fines, porque si existiera una variedad de fines sin orden, estar\u00edamos, por supuesto, confundidos todo el tiempo; no existir\u00edan fines naturales en ning\u00fan sentido razonable. Ahora bien, esta noci\u00f3n de que existen fines naturales del ser humano iba de la mano con la idea de que existen fines naturales en la naturaleza en general. De este modo, en cierto sentido, la filosof\u00eda pol\u00edtica cl\u00e1sica se basa en una suerte de ciencia natural. Dado que la expresi\u00f3n \u00abciencia natural\u00bb ha adquirido un significado tan espec\u00edfico en tiempos modernos, utilizar\u00e9 un t\u00e9rmino m\u00e1s antiguo, el t\u00e9rmino griego, y hablar\u00e9 de physiologia, que significa el discurso, la discusi\u00f3n, de la \u03c6\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, de la naturaleza. Esto fue desarrollado por los fil\u00f3sofos cl\u00e1sicos, aunque con ciertas dificultades, ya que, como muestra el hecho de que Plat\u00f3n y Arist\u00f3teles, en particular, no estuvieron completamente de acuerdo sobre esa physiologia y, sobre todo, de una manera bastante interesante, hubo fil\u00f3sofos en la antig\u00fcedad cl\u00e1sica que elaboraron una physiologia que no era teleol\u00f3gica, esto es, que negaba la existencia de fines naturales. Los representantes m\u00e1s famosos de esta visi\u00f3n son Dem\u00f3crito y Epicurio. Menciono estos nombres deliberadamente: Dem\u00f3crito, antes de Plat\u00f3n; Epicuro, despu\u00e9s\u00bb.<\/span><\/p>\n Perge ad sequ\u0113ns caput<\/a><\/p>\n Redde ad prius caput<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad initium paginae huius<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad indicem<\/a><\/p>\n Socrates\u2019 refutation of the charge of the first accusers is so complete, so devastating as to become in a sense unintelligible. He lends words to \u201cone of you\u201d who might perhaps retort and say: if you do nothing more out of the common than the others, how does it happen that you have been slandered in such an extraordinary manner? must there not be some fire where there is so much smoke? The retort is fair and Socrates will try to show to the jury how he has become the butt of this slander. He is aware that by giving his explanation he will appear to be joking to part of the audience; nevertheless he will tell the whole audience the whole truth. He does have some kind of wisdom\u2014that kind which is perhaps human wisdom as distinguished from the superhuman wisdom of the sophists (and of the physiologists<\/em><\/a>). He is aware that by what he is going to say he could appear to be boasting (and thus involuntarily to be joking). For the speech that he will pronounce is not his but will be traced by him to a speaker who is trustworthy to the audience. That speaker is the god in Delphi or, more precisely, Chaerephon, who was his comrade from his youth and at the same time (what Socrates could not say of himself) a comrade of the multitude, a sound democrat and therefore trustworthy to the audience. As they know, Chaerephon was impetuous and accordingly once, when having come to Delphi, dared to ask the oracle whether anyone is wiser than Socrates. The Pythia replied that no one is wiser. The truth of this story is guaranteed, not by the god, nor by the Pythia, nor even by Chairephon, who is no longer alive, but by Chairephon\u2019s brother. The story of the Delphic oracle is new to the audience, just as the story told by Socrates shortly before, regarding Kallias and Euenos (20a2-c1<\/a>).<\/span><\/p>\n Chairephon\u2019s question presupposed that he regarded Socrates as wise, as singularly wise, before he consulted the oracle. That wisdom of Socrates had nothing whatever to do with the wisdom which he discovered or acquired as a consequence of the Delphic utterance. It was pre-Delphic. In the light of his post-Delphic wisdom his pre-Delphic wisdom may be sheer madness but it was possessed by him or possessed him. He is completely silent about it in his defence before the jury. He gives a hint as to its character by his reference to the Clouds<\/em>, in which Chairephon is presented as Socrates\u2019 companion par excellence<\/em>. But Socrates presents Chairephon as a believer in the Delphic oracle, as pious; his piety strengthens the belief in his revered master\u2019s piety. Or could his consulting the oracle have had a non-pious motive? We are not told why he consulted the oracle. His question is not free from ambiguity: is anyone\u2014man or god\u2014wiser than Socrates? The Pythia\u2019s answer does not remove this ambiguity.<\/span><\/p>\n About the notion of \u201cphysiologists\u201d<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n On the session 1 (18th October 1966 at Chicago University) of the course \u201cPlato\u2019s Apology of Socrates & Crito\u201d Professor Str\u016bthi\u014d clarifies: \u201c[\u2026] the crucial presupposition of classical political philosophy was, as you might have observed, that there are natural ends of man which have a natural order. In other words, there is not a chaos of ends but there is a hierarchy of ends, because if there were a variety of ends with no order, then we would be of course confused all the time; there wouldn\u2019t be natural ends in any reasonable sense. Now this notion that there are natural ends of man went together with the notion that there are natural ends in nature generally speaking. So to that extent, classical political philosophy is based on a certain kind of natural science. Since the word natural science has taken on such a specific meaning in modern times, I will use an older term, the Greek term, and will speak of physiologia, which means the speech, the discussion, of physis, of nature. Now this was done, elaborated by the classical philosophers, and there were certain difficulties because, as is shown by the fact that Plato and Aristotle in particular did not entirely agree as to that physiologia and above all, and in a way most interesting of all, there were philosophers in classical antiquity who developed a physiologia which was not teleological, which denied that there are natural ends. And the most famous representatives of this view are Democritus and Epicurus. I mention these names advisedly, Democritus and Epicurus. Democritus prior to Plato, Epicurus after.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n Perge ad sequ\u0113ns caput<\/a><\/p>\n Redde ad prius caput<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad initium paginae huius<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad indicem<\/a><\/p>\n El texto en lengua inglesa fue publicado de manera p\u00f3stuma en un volumen en honor al prof. Jacob Klein: Essais in Honor of Jacob Klein<\/em> (Annapol\u012b, \u0113 Typographe\u014d Acad\u0113m\u012bae S\u0101nct\u012b I\u014dhannis MCMLXXVI). Aunque nosotros tomamos como base lo aparecido en una antolog\u00eda dedicada a escritos del prof. Str\u016bthi\u014d en ingl\u00e9s en 1983: Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy<\/em> (Sicag\u012b, \u0113 Typographe\u014d \u016aniversit\u0101tis Sicag\u012b MCMLXXXIII). La versi\u00f3n castellana es obra de Aemilia Aquad\u012bs, aparecida en la traducci\u00f3n del volumen mencionado anteriormente (Bon\u0101eropol\u012b, \u0113 Typographe\u014d Am\u014drrort\u012b MMVIII). La publicaci\u00f3n de estos fragmentos promueve la difusi\u00f3n en castellano de la obra del profesor Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d con fines acad\u00e9micos y de formaci\u00f3n. Conminamos a visitar su biblioteca m\u00e1s cercana o adquirir el volumen f\u00edsico en su librer\u00eda de confianza.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Perge ad sequ\u0113ns caput<\/a><\/p>\n Redde ad prius caput<\/a><\/p>\n Perge ad initium paginae huius<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/atriumphilosophicum.es\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/10\/Leo_Strauss_USA_1939-239x300.jpg\")
<\/p>\nVersi\u014d hisp\u0101nica Aemili\u0101 Aquad\u012bt\u012b auctr\u012bce 5<\/span><\/h1>\n
Algunas aclaraciones<\/span><\/h2>\n
Le\u014dnard\u012b Str\u016bthi\u014dnis verba 5<\/span><\/h1>\n
Some clarifications<\/span><\/h2>\n
I\u016bra<\/span><\/h1>\n
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