Parte de:<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00bfQu\u00e9 es la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica? \/ III. Las soluciones Modernas<\/span><\/p>\n

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Por Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d<\/span><\/p>\n\n

Le<\/span>\u014d<\/span>nard<\/span>\u012b<\/span> Str\u016bt<\/span>h<\/span>i<\/span>\u012b<\/span> verba<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

Rousseau was not unaware of these difficulties. They had been caused by the exinanition^{1<\/a><\/sup>See exinanition<\/a> in the Oxford English Dictionary.<\/span> of<\/span> the notion of human nature and ultimately by the turn from man\u2019s end to man\u2019s beginning. Rousseau had accepted Hobbes\u2019s anti-teleological principle. By following it more consistently than Hobbes himself had done, he was compelled to reject Hobbes\u2019s scheme or to demand that the state of nature\u2014man\u2019s primitive and pre-social condition\u2014be understood as perfect, <\/span>i.e., as not <\/span>pointing beyond itself toward society.<\/span> He was compelled to demand that the state of nature, man\u2019s beginning, become the goal for social man: only because man has drifted away from his beginnings, because he has thus become corrupted, does he need an end. That end is primarily the just society. The just society is distinguished from the unjust society by the fact that it comes as close to the state of nature as a society possibly can: the desire determining man in the state of nature, the desire for self-preservation, is the root of the just society and determines its end.<\/span> This fundamental desire which is at the same time the fundamental right, animates the juridical as distinguished from the moral: society is so far from being based on morality that it is the basis of morality; <\/span>the end of society must therefore be defined in juridical, not in <\/span>moral terms; and there cannot be an obligation to enter society <\/span>(<\/span>or the social contract cannot bind \u201cthe body of the people\u201d<\/span>).<\/span> Whatever the meaning and the status of morality may be, it certainly presupposes society, and society, even the just society, is bondage or alienation from nature.<\/span> Man ought therefore to transcend the whole social and moral dimension and to return to the wholeness and sincerity of the state of nature. Since the concern with self-preservation compels man to enter society, man ought to go back beyond <\/span>self<\/span>-preservation to the root of self-preservation. This root, the absolute beginning, is the feeling of existence, the feeling of the sweetness of mere existence. By giving himself to the sole feeling of his present existence without any thought of the future, by thus living in blessed oblivion of every care and fear, the individual senses the sweetness of all existence: he has returned to nature.<\/span> It is the feeling of one\u2019<\/span>s <\/span>existence which gives rise to the desire for the preservation of one\u2019<\/span>s<\/span> existence. <\/span>T<\/span>his desire compels man to devote himself entirely to action and thought, to a life of care and duty and misery, and therewith cuts him off from the bliss which is buried in his depth or origin. Only very few men are capable of finding the way back to nature.<\/span> The tension between the desire for the preservation of existence and the feeling of existence expresses itself therefore in the insoluble antagonism between the large majority who in the best case will be good citizens and the minority of solitary dreamers who are the salt of the earth. Rousseau left it at tha<\/span>t<\/span> antagonism. <\/span>T<\/span>he German philosophers who took up his problem thought <\/span>that<\/span> a reconciliation is possible, and <\/span>that<\/span> reconciliation <\/span>c<\/span>an be brought about, <\/span>or<\/span> has already been brought about, by History.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n}