\u00bfQu\u00e9 es la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica? \/ II. La soluci\u00f3n Cl\u00e1sica<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Por Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d<\/span><\/p>\n\n T<\/span>he practical meaning of the notion of the best regime appears most clearly, when one considers the ambiguity of the term \u201cgood citizen.\u201d Aristotle suggests two entirely different definitions of the good citizen. In his more popular <\/span>Constitution of Athens<\/i><\/span><\/a> he suggests that the good citizen is a man who serves his country well, without any regard to the difference of regimes<\/span>\u2014<\/span><\/strong>who serves his country well in fundamental indifference to the change of regimes. The good citizen, in a word, is the patriotic citizen, the man whose loyalty belongs first and last to his fatherland. In his less popular <\/span>Politics<\/i><\/span><\/a>, Aristotle says that there is not <\/span>the<\/i><\/span> good citizen without qualification. For what it means to be a good citizen depends entirely on the regime. A good citizen in Hitler\u2019<\/span>s<\/span> Germany would be a bad citizen elsewhere. But whereas good citizen is relative to the regime, good man does not have such a relativity. The meaning of good man is always and everywhere the same. The good man is identical with the good citizen only in one case<\/span>\u2014<\/span><\/strong>in the case of the best regime. For only in the best regime is the good of the regime and the good of the good man identical, that goal being virtue. This amounts to saying that in his <\/span>Politics<\/i><\/span> Aristotle questions the proposition that patriotism is enough. From the point of view of the patriot, the fatherland is more important than any difference of regimes. From the point of view of the patriot, he who prefers any regime to the fatherland is a partisan, if not a traitor. Aristotle says in effect that the partisan <\/span>sees<\/span> deeper than the patriot but that only one kind of partisan is superior to the patriot; this is the partisan of virtue. One can express Aristotle\u2019<\/span>s <\/span>thought as follows: patriotism is not enough for the same reason that the most doting mother is happier if her child is good than if he is bad. A mother loves her child because he is her own; she loves what is her own. But she also loves the good. All human love is subject to the law that it be both love of one\u2019<\/span>s <\/span>own and <\/span>love <\/span>of the good, and there is necessarily a tension between one\u2019<\/span>s own <\/span>and the good, a tension which may well lead to a break, be it only the breaking of a heart. The relation between one\u2019<\/span>s <\/span>own and the good finds its political expression in the relation between the father<\/span>land and the regime. In <\/span>the language of classical metaphysics<\/span><\/a>, the <\/span>fatherland or the nation is the matter whereas the regime is the form. The classics held the view that the form is higher in dignity than the matter. One may call this view \u201cidealism.\u201d The practical meaning of this idealism is that the good is of higher dignity than one\u2019<\/span>s <\/span>own, or that the best regime is a higher consideration than the fatherland. The Jewish equivalent of this relation might be said to be the relation between the Torah and Israel.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Next paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n Previous paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n El significado pragm\u00e1tico del concepto del mejor r\u00e9gimen aparece muy claro cuando consideramos la ambig\u00fcedad del t\u00e9rmino <\/span>\u00ab<\/span>buen ciudadano<\/span>\u00bb<\/span>. <\/span>Arist\u00f3teles nos ofrece dos versiones completamente distintas del buen ciudadano. En su muy popular <\/span>Constituci\u00f3n de los atenienses<\/i><\/span><\/a> menciona que el buen ciudadano es el hombre que sirve bien a su pa\u00eds sin tener en consideraci\u00f3n el r\u00e9gimen del mismo <\/span>\u2014<\/span>el que sirve bien a su pa\u00eds con una indiferencia fundamental ante el cambio de r\u00e9gimen. <\/span>El buen ciudadano, en una palabra, es el ciudadano patri\u00f3tico, el hombre cuya lealtad pertenece en primer y en \u00faltimo lugar a su patria. En <\/span>su menos popular <\/span>Pol\u00edtica<\/i><\/span><\/a>, Arist\u00f3teles dice que no existe <\/span>el<\/i><\/span> buen ciudadano sin m\u00e1s; <\/span>pues<\/span> el concepto del buen ciudadano depende por completo del r\u00e9gimen: un buen ciudadano, por ejemplo, en la Alemania de Hitler ser\u00eda un mal ciudadano en cualquier otra parte. No obstante, si el concepto de buen ciudadano es relativo y depende del r\u00e9gimen, no ocurre lo mismo con el concepto de buen <\/span>hombre<\/span>. El concepto de buen <\/span>hombre<\/span> es el mismo siempre y en todo lugar. S\u00f3lo en un caso el buen <\/span>hombre<\/span> es id\u00e9ntico al <\/span>buen ciudadano: en el caso del <\/span>mejor <\/span>r\u00e9gimen. S\u00f3lo en el <\/span>mejor <\/span>r\u00e9gimen <\/span>la<\/span> bondad del r\u00e9gimen <\/span>y<\/span> la bondad del individuo <\/span>son id\u00e9nticas<\/span>, siendo <\/span>su<\/span> meta com\u00fan la virtud. Esto <\/span>equivale a decir que<\/span> en <\/span>su<\/span> Pol\u00edtica<\/i><\/span> Arist\u00f3teles pone en duda la afirmaci\u00f3n de que el patriotismo es suficiente. Desde el punto de vista del patriota, la patria est\u00e1 por encima de toda diferencia de reg\u00edmenes. <\/span>Desde el punto de vista del patriota, cualquiera que prefiera alg\u00fan r\u00e9gimen a la patria es un partisano <\/span>\u2014<\/span>un faccioso, un partidista<\/span>1<\/a><\/sup>El t\u00e9rmino \u00abpartisan\u00bb en ingl\u00e9s acepta las dos acepciones.<\/span><\/span><\/span>\u2014, <\/span>si no es que un traidor. Arist\u00f3<\/span>teles dice, sin embargo, que el <\/span>partisano<\/span> v<\/span>e<\/span> m\u00e1s all\u00e1 que el patriota, aunque s\u00f3lo el <\/span>partisano<\/span> de una clase es mejor que el patriota: aquel que es <\/span>partisano<\/span> de la<\/span> virtud. <\/span>Se podr\u00eda expresar<\/span> el pensamiento de Arist\u00f3teles <\/span>de la siguiente manera<\/span>: el patriotismo no es suficiente por la misma raz\u00f3n <\/span>que la m\u00e1s cari\u00f1osa madre es m\u00e1s feliz si su hijo es bueno que si su hijo es malo<\/span>. Una madre ama a su hijo porque es suyo, ama lo que es suyo. Pero, al mismo tiempo, ama el bien. Todo amor humano est\u00e1 sometido a la ley que le hace ser al mismo tiempo amor a lo que es propio y amor a lo que es bueno; esto hace que se d\u00e9 necesariamente una tensi\u00f3n entre lo propio y lo bueno, tensi\u00f3n que puede muy bien conducir a una ruptura, aunque sea s\u00f3lo la ruptura de un coraz\u00f3n. La relaci\u00f3n entre lo propio y <\/span>el bien<\/span> se expresa pol\u00edticamente a trav\u00e9s de la relaci\u00f3n entre la patria y el r\u00e9gimen. En <\/span>t\u00e9rminos de la metaf\u00edsica cl\u00e1sica<\/span><\/a>, la patria o la naci\u00f3n es la <\/span>materia<\/i><\/span>, mientras que el r\u00e9gimen es la <\/span>forma<\/i><\/span>. Los cl\u00e1sicos sostuvieron que la forma es superior a la <\/span>materia<\/span> en dignidad. A esta posici\u00f3n la podr\u00edamos denominar <\/span>\u00ab<\/span>idealismo<\/span>\u00bb<\/span>. <\/span>El<\/span> significado pr\u00e1ctico de este idealismo consiste en afirmar que lo bueno es <\/span>de mayor dignidad que <\/span>lo propio, o, en otras palabras, que el <\/span>mejor <\/span>r\u00e9gimen merece una <\/span>mayor <\/span>atenci\u00f3n que la patria. El equivalente judaico podr\u00eda encontrarse en la relaci\u00f3n que existe entre <\/span>la<\/span> Torah e Israel.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Siguiente p\u00e1rrafo<\/a><\/p>\n P\u00e1rrafo anterior<\/a><\/p>\n Ir al inicio de esta entrada<\/a><\/p>\nLe<\/span>\u014d<\/span>nard<\/span>\u012b<\/span> Str\u016bt<\/span>h<\/span>i<\/span>\u012b<\/span> verba<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n
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Hisp<\/span>\u0101<\/span>nice<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n