\u00bfQu\u00e9 es la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica? \/ II. La soluci\u00f3n Cl\u00e1sica<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Por Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d<\/span><\/p>\n\n The character of classical political philosophy appears with the greatest clarity from Plato\u2019<\/span>s<\/span> Laws<\/i><\/span>, which is his political work <\/span>par excellence<\/i><\/span>. The <\/span>Laws<\/i><\/span> is a conversation about law, and political things in general, between an old Athenian stranger, an old Cretan, and an old Spartan. The conversation takes place on the island of Crete. At the beginning one receives the impression that the Athenian has come to Crete in order to study there the best laws. For if it is true that the good is identical with the ancestral, the best laws for a Greek would be the oldest Greek laws, and these are the Cretan laws. But the equation of the good with the ancestral is not tenable if the <\/span>first ancestors were not gods, or son of gods, or <\/span>pupils of gods. <\/span>Hence, <\/span>the Cretans beli<\/span>e<\/span>ved that their laws were originated by Zeus, who instructed his son Minos, the Cretan legislator. The <\/span>Laws<\/i><\/span> opens with an expression of this belief. It appears immediately afterwards that this belief has no other ground, no better ground, than a saying of Homer<\/span>\u2014<\/span><\/strong>and the poets are of questionable veracity<\/span>\u2014<\/span><\/strong>as well as what the Cretans say<\/span>\u2014<\/span><\/strong>and the <\/span>Cretans were famous for their lack of veracity. However this may be, very shortly after its beginning, the conversation shifts from the question of the origins of the Cretan laws and the Spartan laws to the question of their intrinsic worth: a code given by a god, by a being of superhuman excellence, must be unqualified<\/span>l<\/span>y good. Very slowly, very circumspectly does the Athenian approach this grave question. To begin with he limits his criticism of the principle underlying the Cretan and the Spartan codes by criticizing not these codes, but a poet, a man without authority and, in addition, an expatriate, who had praised the same principle. In the sequel, the philosopher attacks not yet the Cretan and the Spartan codes, but the interpretation of these codes which had been set forth by his two interlocutors. He does not begin to criticize these venerable codes explicitly until he has appealed to a presumed Cretan and Spartan law which permits such criticism under certain conditions<\/span>\u2014<\/span><\/strong>under conditions which are fulfilled, to some extent, in the present conversation. According to that law, all must say with one voice and with one mouth that all the laws of Crete, or of Sparta, are good because they are god-given, and no once is suffered to say something different; but an old citizen may utter a criticism of an allegedly divine law before a magistrate of his own age if no young men are present. By this time it has become clear to the reader that the Athenian has not come to Crete in order to study there the best laws, but rather in order to introduce into Crete new laws and institutions, truly good laws and institutions. These laws and institutions will prove to be, to a considerable extent, of Athenian origin. It seems that the Athenian, being the son of a highly civilized society, has embarked on the venture of civilizing a rather uncivilized society. Therefore he has to apprehend <\/span>that <\/span>his suggestions will be odious, not only as innovations, but above all as foreign, as Athenian: deep-seated, old animosities and suspicions will be aroused by his recommendations. <\/span>He<\/span> begins his explicit criticism with a remark about the probable connection between certain Cretan and Spartan institutions and the practice of homosexuality in these cities. The Spartan, rising in defense of his fatherland, does not, indeed, defend homosexuality, but, turning to the offensive, rebukes the Athenians for their excessive drinking. The Athenian is thus given a perfect excuse for recommending the introduction of the Athenian institution of banquets: he is com<\/span>pelled to defend that institution; by defending it he acts the part, not of a civilizing philosopher who, being a philosopher, is a philanthropist, but of the patriot. He acts in a way which is perfectly understandable to his interlocutors and perfectly respectable in their opinion. He attempts to show that wine-drinking, and even drunkenness, if it is practiced in well-presided banquets, is conducive to education in temperance or moderation. This speech about wine forms the bulk of the first two books of the <\/span>Laws<\/i><\/span>. Only after the specch about wine has been brought to its conclusion does the Athenian turn to the question of the beginning of political life, to a question which is the true beginning of his political theme. The speech about wine appears to be <\/span>the<\/i><\/span> introduction to political philosophy.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Next paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n Previous paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n El car\u00e1cter de <\/span>la filosof\u00eda pol\u00edtica cl\u00e1sica <\/span>aparecer con magn\u00edfica <\/span>claridad en <\/span>Las leyes<\/i><\/span> de Plat\u00f3n, <\/span>su obra pol\u00edtica<\/span> par excellence<\/i><\/span>. <\/span>Las leyes<\/i><\/span> son una conversaci\u00f3n <\/span>sobre la ley y <\/span>cuestiones pol\u00edticas en generan <\/span>entre <\/span>un viejo<\/span> extranjero ateniense, un <\/span>viejo <\/span>cretense y un <\/span>viejo <\/span>espartano. <\/span>La conversaci\u00f3n tiene lugar en la <\/span>isla de Creta. <\/span>Al principio tenemos la impresi\u00f3n de que el <\/span>ateniense <\/span>ha venido a <\/span>a Creta para estudiar all\u00ed las <\/span>mejores <\/span>leyes. <\/span>Debido a que, si es verdad que lo bueno se identifica con lo ancestral, para un griego las mejores leyes ser\u00edan las leyes griegas m\u00e1s antiguas, que eran, las leyes cretenses. <\/span>Pero, l<\/span>a ecuaci\u00f3n entre lo bueno y lo ancestral <\/span>no es sostenible a no ser que los <\/span> primeros antepasados fuesen dioses, hijos de dioses o disc\u00edpulos de dioses. <\/span>De ah\u00ed que los cretenses creyesen<\/span> que sus leyes ten\u00edan su origen en Zeus, que educ\u00f3 a su hijo Minos, el legislador de Creta. <\/span>Las leyes<\/i><\/span> comienzan <\/span>con una alusi\u00f3n a esta creencia<\/span>. Inmediatamente despu\u00e9s se muestra c\u00f3mo esa creencia no tiene otra base mejor que una expresi\u00f3n de Homero \u2014<\/span>ya hemos sido alertado que los poetas son de cuestionable veracidad<\/span>\u2014 y lo que los cretenses dicen \u2014<\/span>era proverbial la falta de veracidad de los habitantes de Creta<\/span>. <\/span>Sea como fuere, al poco de su comienzo, la conver<\/span>saci\u00f3n da un giro desde la cuesti\u00f3n de los or\u00edgenes de las leyes cretenses y espartanas hacia el problema del valor intr\u00ednseco de las leyes: un c\u00f3digo dado por un dios, por un ser de excelencia sobrehumana, debe ser absolutamente bueno. Es de manera muy pausada y circunspecta que el Ateniense aborda este asunto tan serio. Para empezar, limita su cr\u00edtica al principio que subyace a las leyes cretenses y espartanas criticando no tanto a las mismas, sino m\u00e1s bien a un poeta, a un hombre sin autoridad y \u2014<\/span>para colmo<\/span>\u2014 <\/span>un expatriado que hab\u00eda alabado aquel principio. Para despu\u00e9s continuar atacando no a\u00fan las leyes cretenses y espartanas, sino la interpretaci\u00f3n que de esos c\u00f3digos hab\u00edan dado sus dos interlocutores. <\/span>No comienza a criticar abiertamente estas venerables leyes hasta despu\u00e9s de apelar a una presunta ley cretense y espartana que permite esta cr\u00edtica en determinadas circunstancias \u2014circunstancias que se cumplen, hasta cierto punto, en <\/span>la conversaci\u00f3n en curso<\/span>. Seg\u00fan esa ley, todos tienen que decir a una sola voz <\/span>y con una sola boca<\/span> que todas las leyes de Creta, o de Esparta, son buenas porque tienen su origen en un dios, y a nadie se le permite decir otra cosa; pero un ciudadano viejo puede <\/span>pronunciar una <\/span>critica una ley tenida por divina ante un magistrado de su misma edad si no est\u00e1 presente ning\u00fan hombre joven. <\/span>Al llegar a este punto queda claro al lector que el ateniense no ha venido a Creta para estudiar las mejores leyes, sino m\u00e1s bien con la intenci\u00f3n de introducir en Creta nuevas leyes e instituciones, unas leyes e instituciones verdaderamente buenas. Estas leyes e instituciones resultar\u00e1n, en su inmensa mayor\u00eda, de origen ateniense. Al parecer, el ateniense, al ser hijo de una sociedad <\/span>civilizada, se hab\u00eda embarcado en la <\/span>empresa<\/span> de civilizar una sociedad <\/span>un tanto<\/span> inculta. <\/span>Por tal motivo<\/span>, <\/span>debe<\/span> tener en cuenta que sus sugerencias son recibidas como odiosas no s\u00f3lo por tratarse de innovaciones, sino, sobre todo, por ser extranjeras, por ser atenienses: <\/span>sus recomendaciones despertaran antiguas animosidades y sospechas profundamente arraigadas<\/span>. <\/span>Comienza su cr\u00edtica expl\u00edcita <\/span>se\u00f1alando la probable conexi\u00f3n entre ciertas instituciones cretenses y espartanas y la pr\u00e1ctica de la <\/span>h<\/span>omosexualidad en ambas ciudades. El espartano, levant\u00e1ndose en defensa de su patria, no defiende, sin embargo, la homosexualidad, sino que, tomando la ofensiva, reprocha a los atenienses su excesivo gusto por la bebida. El ateniense tiene as\u00ed una excusa perfecta para recomendar la introducci\u00f3n de la instituci\u00f3n ateniense de los banquetes: se ve obligado a defender esa instituci\u00f3n; al defenderla, no act\u00faa como un fil\u00f3sofo civilizador, que por ser fil\u00f3sofo debe ser un fil\u00e1ntropo, sino como un patriota. <\/span>Act\u00faa en una manera que es perfectamente entendible para sus <\/span>interlocutores y absolutamente respetable en su opini\u00f3n. Intenta demostrar que beber vino, e incluso emborracharse, si se lleva a cabo en banquetes <\/span>bien presididos, <\/span>es un medio conducente <\/span>a la educaci\u00f3n en <\/span>templanza y moderaci\u00f3n. El discurso sobre el vino <\/span>ocupa el grueso<\/span> de los dos primeros libros de <\/span>Las <\/i><\/span>L<\/i><\/span>eyes<\/i><\/span>. <\/span>Solo cuando este discurso sobre el vino ha sido llevado a su conclusi\u00f3n, es cuando el ateniense apunta a la cuesti\u00f3n del inicio de la vida pol\u00edtica, a la cuesti\u00f3n que es el verdadero inicio de su tema pol\u00edtico<\/span>. El discurso sobre <\/span>el vino<\/span> aparece, as\u00ed, como <\/span>la<\/i><\/span> introducci\u00f3n a la filosof\u00eda pol\u00edtica.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Siguiente p\u00e1rrafo<\/a><\/p>\n P\u00e1rrafo anterior<\/a><\/p>\n Ir al inicio de esta entrada<\/a><\/p>\nLe<\/span>\u014d<\/span>nard<\/span>\u012b<\/span> Str\u016bt<\/span>h<\/span>i<\/span>\u012b<\/span> verba<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/atriumphilosophicum.es\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/TestaAlcibiades-300x205.jpg\")
Hisp<\/span>\u0101<\/span>nice<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n