Parte de:<\/span><\/p>\n \u00bfQu\u00e9 es la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica? \/ I. El problema de la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Por Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d<\/span><\/p>\n\n It <\/span>is only at this point that we come face to face with the serious antagonist of political philosophy: historicism. After having reached its full growth historicism is distinguished from positivism by <\/span>the following characteristics. <\/span>(1)<\/b><\/span> It abandons the distinction between facts and values, because every understanding, however theor<\/span>e<\/span>tical, implies specific evaluations. <\/span>(2)<\/b><\/span> It denies the authoritative character of modern science, which appears as only one form among many of man\u2019s thinking orientation in the world. <\/span>(3)<\/b><\/span> It refuses to regard the historical process as fundamentally <\/span>progressive, or, more generally stated, as reasonable. <\/span>(4)<\/b><\/span> It denies the relevance of the evolutionist thesis by contending that the evolution of man out of non-man cannot make intelligible man\u2019s humanity. Historicism rejects the question of the good society, that is to say, of <\/span>the<\/i><\/span> good society, because of the essentially historical character of society and of human thought: there is no essential necessity for raising the question of the good society; this question is not in principle coeval with man; its very possibility is the outcome of a mysterious dispensation of fate. The crucial issue concerns the status of those permanent characteristics of humanity, such as the distinction between the noble and the base, which are admitted by the thoughtful historicists: can these permanencies be used as criteria for distinguishing between good and bad dispensations of fate? The historicist answers this question in the negative. He looks down on the permanencies in question because of their objective, common, superficial and rudimentary character: <\/span>to become <\/span>relevant, they <\/span>would <\/span>have to be completed, and their completion is no longer common but historical. It was the contempt for these permanencies which permitted the most radical historicist in 1933 to submit to, or rather to welcome, as a dispensation of fate, the verdict of the least wise and least moderate part of his nation while it was in its least wise and least moderate mood, and at the same time to speak of wisdom and moderation. The biggest event of 1933 would rather s<\/span>e<\/span>em to have proved, if such proof was necessary, that man cannot abandon the question of the good society, and that he cannot free himself from the responsibility for answering it by deferring to History or to any other power different from his own reason.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Next paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n Previous paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n Unicamente cuando arribamos a este punto nos podemos dar de bruces con el mayor antagonista de la filosof\u00eda pol\u00edtica: el historicismo. Al alcanzar su desarrollo completo, el historicismo puede ser diferenciado del positivismo por las siguientes caracter\u00edsticas. (i)<\/span><\/strong> Abandona la distinci\u00f3n entre hechos y valores, porque cada modo de entender, por muy te\u00f3rico que \u00e9ste sea, implica valoraciones espec\u00edficas. (ii) <\/strong><\/span><\/span>Le niega a la ciencia moderna el papel de voz autorizada, haci\u00e9ndola aparecer como una voz entre otras en lo que respecta al empleo del entendimiento. (iii)<\/span><\/strong><\/span> R<\/span>echaza toda consideraci\u00f3n del proceso hist\u00f3rico como algo <\/span>eminentemente gradual y continuo <\/span>\u2014<\/span>progresivo<\/span>\u2014o, en t\u00e9rminos m\u00e1s amplios, como algo eminentemente <\/span>razonable <\/span>\u2014<\/span>en su sentido amplio. (iv)<\/strong><\/span> N<\/span>iega <\/span>el valor de la tesis <\/span>evolucionista aduciendo que la evoluci\u00f3n del hombre, partiendo de un ser no humano, hace ininteligible <\/span>la humanidad del hombre<\/span>. El historicismo <\/span>se niega a plantear la cuesti\u00f3n de la buena sociedad, enti\u00e9ndaseme,<\/span> la<\/i><\/span> buena sociedad. Esto se debe al <\/span>car\u00e1cter esencialmente hist\u00f3rico de la sociedad y del pensamiento humano: <\/span>no existe tal necesidad esencial de plantear la cuesti\u00f3n de la sociedad buena; dicha cuesti\u00f3n no es en principio coet\u00e1nea al hombre; su mera posibilidad es el resultado <\/span>de un privilegio misteriosamente otorgado por <\/span>el destino.<\/span> El problema crucial se plantea respecto al <\/span>estatus de esas caracter\u00edsticas permanentes de la humanidad, tales como la distinci\u00f3n entre lo noble y lo concerniente al pueblo llano<\/span>, que son admitidos por los historicistas precavidos. \u00bf<\/span>Podr\u00edamos emplear dichas elementos permanentes<\/span> como criterios de distinci\u00f3n entre buen<\/span>o<\/span>s y mal<\/span>o<\/span>s <\/span>privilegios otorgados por<\/span> el destino? El historicista contesta a esta pregunta <\/span>de manera <\/span>negativa. <\/span>D<\/span>esprecia<\/span> estos elementos permanentes por su car\u00e1cter objetivo, <\/span>com\u00fan,<\/span> superficial y rudimentario: para <\/span>que los considere relevantes, deben ser completados, y su compl<\/span>eci\u00f3n<\/span> les priva de su car\u00e1cter com\u00fan, les otorga un car\u00e1cter hist\u00f3rico. <\/span>Fue el desd\u00e9n hacia esos elementos permanentes el que permiti\u00f3 al <\/span>historicista m\u00e1s radical, en 1933, someterse \u2014o mejor, recibir como <\/span>un privilegio del azaroso <\/span>destino\u2014 al veredicto de la parte menos prudente y menos moderada de su <\/span>naci\u00f3n e<\/span>n el momento en que \u00e9st<\/span>a<\/span> atravesaba su fase hist\u00f3rica menos moderada y menos prudente y, al mismo tiempo, pronunciarse por la prudencia y por la moderaci\u00f3n. El acontecimiento <\/span>m\u00e1s importante <\/span>del a\u00f1o 1933 <\/span>parecer\u00eda m\u00e1s bien haber demostrado, <\/span>si es que esa prueba era necesaria, que el hombre no puede dejar de plantearse el tema de la sociedad buena y que no puede tampoco liberarse de la responsabilidad de dar una respuesta, <\/span>acatando el dictamen de la Historia o de cualquier otra potencia distinta al de su <\/span>su propia raz\u00f3n.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Siguiente p\u00e1rrafo<\/a><\/p>\n P\u00e1rrafo anterior<\/a><\/p>\n Ir al inicio de esta entrada<\/a><\/p>\nLe<\/span>\u014d<\/span>nard<\/span>\u012b<\/span> Str\u016bt<\/span>h<\/span>i<\/span>\u012b<\/span> verba<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n
Hisp<\/span>\u0101<\/span>nice<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n