\u00bfQu\u00e9 es la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica? \/ I. El problema de la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Por Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d<\/span><\/p>\n\n (2)<\/b><\/span> The rejection of value judgments is based on the assumption that the conflicts between different values or valu<\/span>e<\/span>-systems are essentially insoluble for human reason. But this assumption, while generally taken to be sufficiently established, has never been proven. Its proof would require an effort of the magnitude of that which went into the conception and elaboration of the <\/span>Critique of Pure Reason<\/i><\/span>; it would require a comprehensive critique of evaluating reason. What we find in fact are sketchy observations which pretend to prove that this or that specific value conflict is insoluble. It is prudent to grant that there are value conflicts which cannot <\/span>in fact be settled by human reason. But if we cannot decide which <\/span>of two mountains whose peaks are hidden by clouds is higher than the other, cannot we decide that a mountain is higher than a molehill? If we cannot decide, regarding a war between two neighbo<\/span>u<\/span>ring nations which have been fighting each other for centuries, which nation\u2019s Cause is more just, cannot we decide that <\/span>Jezebel<\/span><\/a>\u2019s action<\/a> against <\/span>Naboth<\/span><\/a> was inexcusable? The greatest representative of social science positivism, <\/span>Max Weber<\/a><\/span>, has postulated the insolubility of all value conflicts, because his soul craved a universe in which failure, that bastard of forceful sinning accompanied by still more forceful faith, instead of felicity and serenity, was to be the mark of human nobility. The beli<\/span>e<\/span>f that value judgments are not subject, in the last analysis, to rational control, encourages the inclination to make irresponsible assertions regarding right and wrong or good and bad. One evades serious discussion of s<\/span>e<\/span>rious issues by the simple device of passing them off as value problems. One even creates the impression that all important human conflicts are value conflicts, whereas, to say the least, many of these conflicts arise out of men\u2019s very agreement regarding values.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Next paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n Previous paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n (<\/span>2) <\/span><\/span><\/strong>El rechazo a <\/span>los juicios de valor se basa en <\/span>el supuesto de que los conflictos entre diferentes valores o entre sistemas de valores son esencialmente irresolubles para la raz\u00f3n humana<\/span>. Pero esta suposici\u00f3n, aunque generalmente se la considera <\/span>suficientemente asentada<\/span>, nunca ha sido <\/span>probada<\/span>. Su comprobaci\u00f3n requerir\u00eda un esfuerzo semejante al que condujo a la concepci\u00f3n y elaboraci\u00f3n de la <\/span>Cr\u00edtica de la raz\u00f3n pura<\/i><\/span>; requerir\u00eda una cr\u00edtica compre<\/span>he<\/span>nsiva de la raz\u00f3n <\/span>evaluadora<\/span>. Lo que <\/span>en realidad <\/span>nos encontramos son observaciones <\/span>poco precisas<\/span> que pretenden probar que \u00e9ste o aquel conflicto concreto de valores es <\/span>irresoluble<\/span>. Es prudente aceptar que hay conflictos de valores que la raz\u00f3n humana, de hecho, no puede resolver. Pero si nosotros no pudi\u00e9ramos decidir cu\u00e1l de las monta\u00f1as cuyos picos estuviesen cubiertos por nubes es la m\u00e1s alta, \u00bfno podr\u00edamos tampoco decidir que una monta\u00f1a es m\u00e1s alta que <\/span>la tierra acumulada en una de las entradas de una topera<\/span>? Si nosotros no podemos decidir en una guerra entre dos pa\u00edses vecinos que se han estado peleando durante siglos cu\u00e1l de los dos tiene la raz\u00f3n, \u00bfno podr\u00edamos tampoco decidir que la acci\u00f3n de Jezabel<\/a> contra Naboth fue injustificable?1<\/a><\/sup>Alusi\u00f3n al episodio<\/a> narrado en I Reyes<\/em> 21:1-16.<\/span> El m\u00e1s destacado de los representantes de la ciencia social positivista, Max Weber<\/a>, ha <\/span>sostenido la irresolubilidad de <\/span>todos los conflictos de valores porque su alma ansiaba un mundo en que <\/span>el fracaso <\/span>\u2014<\/span>ese <\/span>bastard<\/span>o<\/span> del pecado violento acompa\u00f1ado de una fe todav\u00eda m\u00e1s violenta\u2014, en lugar de la felicidad y la serenidad, fuera la nota distintiva de la dignidad humana. La creencia de que los juicios de valor no est\u00e1n sujetos en \u00faltimo an\u00e1lisis a control racional fomenta la tendencia a emitir aseveraciones irresponsables respecto a <\/span>lo correcto<\/span> y <\/span>lo equivocado<\/span> o a lo bueno y a lo malo. Se evaden discusiones importantes de problemas serios por el m\u00e9todo simple de pasarlos por alto como conflictos de valores. <\/span>Se puede,<\/span> incluso, crear la impresi\u00f3n de que todos los conflictos humanos importantes son conflictos de valor, cuando en realidad, <\/span>por no decir otra cosa,<\/span> la mayor parte de estos conflictos surgen precisamente de <\/span>su adhesi\u00f3n a esos<\/span> valores.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Siguiente p\u00e1rrafo<\/a><\/p>\n P\u00e1rrafo anterior<\/a><\/p>\n Ir al inicio de esta entrada<\/a><\/p>\nLe<\/span>\u014d<\/span>nard<\/span>\u012b<\/span> Str\u016bt<\/span>h<\/span>i<\/span>\u014dnis verba<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n
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Hisp<\/span>\u0101<\/span>nice<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n