Parte de:<\/span><\/p>\n \u00bfQu\u00e9 es la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica? \/ I. El problema de la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Por Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d<\/span><\/p>\n\n It is not necessary to enter here and now into a discussion of the theoretical weaknesses of social science positivism. It suffices to allude to the considerations which speak decisively against this <\/span>school. <\/span>(1)<\/b><\/span> It is impossible to study social phenomena, i.e., all im<\/span>portant social phenomena, without making value judgments. A man who sees no reason for not despising people whose horizon is limited to their consumption of food and their digestion may be a tolerable econometrist; he cannot say anything relevant about the character of a human society. A man who refuses to distinguish between great statesmen, mediocrities, and insane impostors may be a good bibliographer; he cannot say anything relevant about politics and political history. A man who cannot distinguish between a profound religious thought and a languishing superstition may be a good statistician; he cannot say anything relevant about the sociology of religion. Generally speaking, it is impossible to understand thought or action or work without evaluating it. If we are unable to evaluate adequately, as we very frequently are, we have not yet succeeded in understanding adequately. The value judgments which are forbidden to enter through the front door of political science, sociology or <\/span>e<\/span>conomics, enter these disciplines through the back door; they come from that annex of present-day social science which is called psychopathology. Social scientists s<\/span>ee <\/span>themselves compelled to speak of unbalanced, neurotic, maladjusted people. But these value judgments are distinguished from those used by the great historians, not by greater clarity or certainty, but merely by their poverty: a slick operator is as well adjusted as, he may be better adjusted than, a good man or a good citizen. Finally, we must not overlook the invisible value judgments which are concealed from undiscerning eyes but nevertheless most powerfully present in allegedly purely descriptive concepts. For example, when social scientists distinguish between democratic and authoritarian habits or types of human beings, what they call \u201c<\/span>\u00b7<\/span>authoritarian\u201d is in all cases known to me a caricature of everything of which they, as good democrats of a certain kind, disapprove. Or when they speak of three principles of legitimacy, rational, traditional, and charismatic, their very expression \u201croutinization of charisma\u201d betrays a Protestant or liberal preference which no conservative <\/span>Jew<\/span> and no Catholic would accept: in the light of the notion of \u201croutinization of charisma,\u201d the genesis of the Halaka<\/a><\/span>h<\/span> out of Biblical prophesy on the one hand, and the genesis of the Catholic Church out of the New Testament<\/a> teaching, necessarily appear as cases of \u201crou<\/span>t<\/span>inization of charisma.\u201d If the objection should be made that value <\/span>judgments are indeed inevitable in social science but have a merely <\/span>conditional character, I would reply as follows: are the conditions in question not necessarily fulfilled when we are interested in social phenomena? must the social scientist not necessarily make the assumption that a healthy social life in this world is good, just as medicine necessarily makes the assumption that health and a healthy long life are good? And also are not all factual assertions based on conditions, or assumptions, which however do not become questionable as long as we deal with facts qua facts (<\/span>e.g.<\/span>, that there are \u201cfacts,\u201d that events have causes)?<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Next paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n Previous paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n No es necesario que entremos ahora a discutir los puntos d\u00e9biles de la teor\u00eda positivista aplicada a las ciencias sociales. Ser\u00e1 suficiente aludir a algunas consideraciones que hablan por s\u00ed mismas contra esta escuela. (<\/strong><\/span><\/span>1)<\/span><\/strong><\/span> Es imposible el estudio de los fen\u00f3menos sociales, <\/span>esto es, de todo<\/span> fen\u00f3meno social importante, sin emitir juicios de valor<\/span>. Un hombre que no encuentra ninguna raz\u00f3n para despreciar a aquellos cuyo horizonte vital se limita al consumo de alimentos y a una buena digesti\u00f3n puede ser un econometrista tolerable, pero nunca podr\u00e1 hacer aportaci\u00f3n v\u00e1lida alguna sobre el car\u00e1cter de una sociedad humana. Un hombre que rechace la distinci\u00f3n entre grandes pol\u00edticos, mediocridades <\/span>e usurpadores perturbados<\/span> puede ser un buen bibli\u00f3grafo, pero no tendr\u00e1 nada que decir sobre pol\u00edtica o historia pol\u00edtica. Un hombre incapaz de distinguir entre un pensamiento religioso profundo y una superstici\u00f3n en trance de desaparecer puede ser un <\/span>buen<\/span> estad\u00edstico, pero no podr\u00e1 decir nada significativo sobre sociolog\u00eda de la religi\u00f3n. En general, es imposible comprender un pensamiento, una acci\u00f3n o una obra sin <\/span>evaluarlas<\/span>. Si somos incapaces de <\/span>evaluarlas de manera <\/span>adecuad<\/span>a<\/span>, como ocurre con frecuencia, eso quiere decir que no hemos logrado todav\u00eda <\/span>comprenderlos <\/span>adecuadamente. Los juicios de valor <\/span>tiene vetado el acceso a la puerta principal de la <\/span> ciencia pol\u00edtica, la sociolog\u00eda o la econom\u00eda entran en estas disciplinas por la puerta <\/span>trasera<\/span>; se introducen a trav\u00e9s de esa <\/span>disciplina<\/span> a<\/span>n<\/span>eja a la actual ciencia pol\u00edtica que se llama psicopatolog\u00eda. <\/span>Los<\/span> cient\u00edfico<\/span>s<\/span> social<\/span>es<\/span> se ve<\/span>n<\/span> compelido<\/span>s<\/span> a hablar <\/span>de<\/span> individuos desequilibrados, neur\u00f3ticos o inadaptados. Estos juicios de valor, sin embargo, se diferencian de los que los gra<\/span>ndes <\/span>historiadores utilizan, no por su mayor claridad o exactitud, sino precisamente por su <\/span>pobreza<\/span>: un operario insensato puede sentirse tan adaptado, o incluso mejor, que un hombre honesto o un buen ciudadano. Finalmente, no debemos pasar desapercibidos ante los juicios de valor invisibles que se ocultan a los ojos poco atentos pero que est\u00e1n muy presentes en conceptos que parecen puramente descriptivos. Por ejemplo: cuando los cient\u00edficos sociales distinguen entre h\u00e1bitos o tipos humanos democr\u00e1ticos y autoritarios, lo que llaman <\/span>\u00ab<\/span>autoritario<\/span>\u00bb<\/span> estoy seguro de que no es otra cosa que una caricatura de lo que ellos, como buenos dem\u00f3cratas, rechazan. O cuando hablan de los tres principios de legitimidad <\/span>(<\/span>racional, tradicional y carism\u00e1tico), su simple expresi\u00f3n <\/span>\u00ab<\/span>rutinizaci\u00f3n del carisma<\/span>\u00bb<\/span> descubre un pensamiento protestante o liberal que ning\u00fan jud\u00edo conservador o ning\u00fan cat\u00f3lico podr\u00eda aceptar: a la luz del concepto <\/span>\u00ab<\/span>rutinizaci\u00f3n del carisma<\/span>\u00bb<\/span>, <\/span>la<\/span> g\u00e9nesis <\/span>del<\/span> Ha<\/span>l<\/span>akah<\/span><\/a>, sacada de las profec\u00edas b\u00edblicas, por una parte, y <\/span>la<\/span> g\u00e9nesis de la Iglesia Cat\u00f3lica, sacada de las ense\u00f1anzas del Nuevo Testamento<\/a>, aparecen necesariamente como casos de <\/span>\u00ab<\/span>rutinizaci\u00f3n del carisma<\/span>\u00bb<\/span>. Si se me objetase que los juicios de valor son, en efecto, inevitables en las ciencias sociales, pero tienen solamente un car\u00e1cter condicional, contestar\u00eda de este modo: \u00bfno son esenciales estas condiciones en lo que respecta a los fen\u00f3menos sociales? \u00bfNo <\/span>est\u00e1 obligado<\/span> el cient\u00edfico social <\/span>necesariamente a <\/span>suponer que una vida social sana en este mundo es algo bueno, del mismo modo que la medicina supone necesariamente que la salud y la longevidad sana son cosas buenas? \u00bfNo est\u00e1n todas las afirmaciones <\/span>f\u00e1cticas<\/span> basadas en condiciones o suposiciones, aunque nunca se planteen como problema mientras estemos considerando los hechos como hechos <\/span>(<\/span>por ejemplo: que existe el <\/span>\u00ab<\/span>hecho<\/span>\u00bb<\/span>, o que todo lo que ocurre tiene una causa)?<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Siguiente p\u00e1rrafo<\/a><\/p>\n P\u00e1rrafo anterior<\/a><\/p>\n Ir al inicio de esta entrada<\/a><\/p>\nLe<\/span>\u014d<\/span>nard<\/span>\u012b<\/span> Str\u016bt<\/span>h<\/span>i<\/span>\u014dnis verba<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n
Hisp<\/span>\u0101<\/span>nice<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n