\u00bfQu\u00e9 es la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica? \/ I. El problema de la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Por Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d<\/span><\/p>\n\n A discussion of the tenets of social science positivism is today indispensable for explaining the meaning of political philosophy. We reconsider especially the practical consequences of this positivism. Positivistic social science is \u201cvalue-free\u201d or \u201cethically neutral\u201d: it is neutral in the conflict between good and evil, however good and evil may be understood. This means that the ground which is common to all social scientists, the ground on which they carry on their investigations and discussions, can only be reached through a process of emancipation from moral judgments, or of abstracting from moral judgments: moral obtuseness is the necessary condition for scientific analysis. For to the extent to which we are not yet completely insensitive to moral distinctions, we are forced to make value judgments. The habit of looking at social or human phenomena without making value judgments has a corroding influence on any preferences. The more serious we are as social scientists, the more completely we develop within ourselves <\/span>a state <\/span>of indifference to any goal, or of aimlessness and drifting, a state which may be called nihilism. The social scientist is not immune to preferences; his activity is a constant fight against the preferences he has as a human being and a citizen and which threaten to overcome his scientific detachment. He derives the power to counteract these dangerous influences by his dedication to one and only one value<\/span>\u2014<\/span><\/strong>to truth. But according to his principles, truth is not a value which it is necessary to choose: one may reject it as well as choose it. The scientist as scientist must ind<\/span>ee<\/span>d have chosen it. But neither scientists nor <\/span>scien<\/span>ce are simply necessary. Social science cannot pronounce on the question of whether social science itself is good. It is then compelled to teach that society can with equal right and with equal reason favo<\/span>u<\/span>r social science as well as suppress it as disturbing, subversive, corrosive, nihilistic. But strangely enough we find social scientists very anxious to \u201csell\u201d social science, i.<\/span>e<\/span>., to prove that social science is necessary. They will argue as follows. Regardless of what our preferences or ends may be, we wish to achieve our ends; to achieve our ends, we must know which <\/span>m<\/span>eans are conducive to our ends; but adequate knowledge of the means conducive to any social ends is the sole function of social science and only of social science; hence social science is necessary for any society or any social movement; social science is then simply necessary; it is a value from every point of view. But once we grant this we are seriously tempted to wonder if there are not a few other things which must be values from every point of view or for every thinking human being. To avoid this inconvenience the social scientist will scorn all considerations of public relations or of private advancement, and take refuge in the virtuous contention that he does not know, but merely believes that quest for truth is good: other men may believe with equal right that quest for truth is bad. But what does he mean by this contention? <\/span>E<\/span>ither he makes a distinction between noble and ignoble objectives or he refuses to make such a distinction. If he makes a distinction between noble and ignoble objectives he will say there is a variety of noble objectives or of ideals, and that there is no ideal which is compatible with all other ideals: if one chooses truth as one\u2019s ideal, one necessarily rejects other ideals; this being the case, there cannot be a necessity, an evident necessity for noble men to choose truth in preference to other ideals. But as long as the social scientist speaks <\/span>of ideals, and thus makes a distinction between noble and not noble objectives, or between idealistic integrity and petty egoism, he makes a value judgment which according to his fundamental contention is, as such, no longer necessary. He must then say that it is as legitimate to make the pursuit of safety, income, deference one\u2019<\/span>s<\/span> sole aim in life as it is to make the quest for truth one\u2019<\/span>s<\/span> chief aim. He thus lays himself open to the suspicion that his activity as a social scientist serves no other purpose than to increase his safety, his income, and his prestige, or that his competence as a social scientist is a skill which he is prepared to sell to the highest bidder. Honest citizens will begin to wonder whether such a man can be trusted, or whether he can be loyal, especially since he must maintain that it is as defensible to choose loyalty as one\u2019<\/span>s<\/span> value as it is to reject it. In a word, he will get entangled in the predicament which <\/span>le<\/span>ads to the downfall of Thrasymachus and his taming by Socrates in the first book of Plato\u2019s <\/span>Republic<\/i><\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Next paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n Previous paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n Para explicar el significado de la filosof\u00eda pol\u00edtica, se hace hoy imprescindible acomenter un debate sobre los elementos <\/span>\u2014<\/span>principios<\/span>\u2014 <\/span>del positivismo cient\u00edfico-social<\/span>. <\/span>Reconsideremos <\/span>especialmente las consecuencias pr\u00e1cticas que <\/span>conlleva<\/span> este positivismo. La ciencia social positivista es<\/span>ta<\/span> \u00ab<\/span>libre de valores<\/span>\u00bb <\/span>o, dicho de otro modo, es <\/span>\u00ab<\/span>\u00e9ticamente neutral<\/span>\u00bb<\/span>: es <\/span>neutral<\/span> ante el conflicto entre el bien y el mal, cualquiera que sea la forma en que el bien y el mal puedan ser interpr<\/span>e<\/span>ta<\/span>dos<\/span>. Esto significa que el campo com\u00fan a todos los cient\u00edficos sociales, el campo en que desarrollan todas sus investigaciones y discusiones, s\u00f3lo puede ser alcanzado a trav\u00e9s de un proceso de liberaci\u00f3n de los juicios morales o de un proceso de abstracci\u00f3n absoluta: la ceguera moral es condici\u00f3n indispensable para el an\u00e1lisis cient\u00edfico. En el mismo grado en que a\u00fan no seamos insensibles a las diferencias morales, nos veremos forzados a utilizar juicios de valor. <\/span>La costumbre de mirar a los fen\u00f3menos sociales o humanos<\/span> sin emitir juicios de valor <\/span>comporta una influencia corrosiva en cualquiera de nuestras preferencias<\/span>. Cuanto m\u00e1s serios seamos como cient\u00edficos sociales, m\u00e1s radicalmente desarrollaremos en nosotros mismos un estado de indiferencia hacia <\/span>cualquier logro<\/span>, <\/span>hacia la ausencia de metas y hacia el estado de <\/span>\u00abestar cual <\/span>hoja al viento<\/span>\u00bb<\/span>, un estado que podr\u00eda denominarse de <\/span>nihilismo<\/span><\/a>. El cient\u00edfico social no <\/span>es inmune a l<\/span>as preferencias; su actividad es una lucha constante contra las que siente como ser humano y como ciudadano, que amenazan con sobreponerse a su imparcialidad cient\u00edfica. <\/span>El cient\u00edfico social obtiene el poder necesario para <\/span>contrarrestar todas estas influencias peligrosas a su dedicaci\u00f3n de un solo valor: la verdad. Sin embargo, seg\u00fan sus principios, la verdad no es un valor que haya que elegir necesariamente. Se puede, igualmente, elegir la verdad o rechazarla. El cient\u00edfico \u2014<\/span>como<\/span> cient\u00edfico\u2014 tiene que haberla <\/span>efectivamente <\/span>elegido. Pero ni los cient\u00edficos ni la ciencia son meramente necesarios. La ciencia social no puede pronunciarse sobre si ella misma es buena. Est\u00e1, <\/span>por ello,<\/span> obligada a ense\u00f1ar que la sociedad puede con igual derecho y con las mismas razones favorecer el desarrollo de las ciencias sociales o suprimirlas como perturbadoras, subversivas, corrosivas o nihilistas. <\/span>Pero, por extra\u00f1o que parezca<\/span>, <\/span>vemos a los<\/span> cient\u00edficos sociales muy deseosos de <\/span>\u00ab<\/span>vender<\/span>\u00bb<\/span> la <\/span>ciencia social, de probar que la ciencia social es necesaria. <\/span>Nos argumentar\u00e1n lo siguiente<\/span>: independientemente de cu\u00e1les puedan ser nuestras preferencias, nosotros deseamos el logro de nuestros fines; para lograrlos necesitamos conocer cu\u00e1les son los medios que nos conducen a ellos; y el conocimiento adecuado de los medios que conducen a cualquier fin social es <\/span>la \u00fanica<\/span> funci\u00f3n de la ciencia social y s\u00f3lo de la ciencia social; de aqu\u00ed que la ciencia social sea necesaria para cualquier sociedad o para cualquier movimiento social; l<\/span>a<\/span> ciencia social es, pues, <\/span>simplemente necesaria<\/span>; representa un valor desde todos los puntos de vista. Sin embargo, una vez que hemos aceptado este planteamiento, nos vemos profundamente inclinados a preguntarnos si no habr\u00e1 unas pocas cosas m\u00e1s que representen valores desde todos los puntos de vista y para todos los seres humanos pensantes. Para evitar estas dificultades, el cient\u00edfico social desde\u00f1ar\u00e1 toda consideraci\u00f3n sobre <\/span>relaciones p\u00fablicas o desarrollo privado<\/span> y se refugiar\u00e1 en su virtuosa expresi\u00f3n d<\/span>e<\/span> que \u00e9l no sabe, sino que solamente cree, que buscar la verdad es bueno: otro<\/span>s hombres podr\u00edan considerar con el mismo derecho<\/span> que buscar la verdad es malo. Pero \u00bfqu\u00e9 es lo que quiere decir con esto? O bien distingue entre objetivos nobles e innobles o bien rechaza esta distinci\u00f3n. <\/span>Si<\/span> distingue entre objetivos nobles e innobles, admitir\u00e1 que existen varios objetivos o ideales nobles, y que un ideal no es compatible con los dem\u00e1s: si se elige la verdad como ideal propio, necesariamente se rechazan los dem\u00e1s ideales. <\/span>Siendo este el caso<\/span>, no puede existir la necesidad para los hombres nobles de elegir ineludiblemente la verdad con preferencia sobre otros ideales. Pero cuando el cient\u00edfico social habla de ideales y distingue entre objetivos nobles e innobles o entre integridad ideal y <\/span>penoso <\/span>ego\u00edsmo, est\u00e1 emitiendo juicios de valor que de acuerdo con sus principios b\u00e1sicos son, como tales, innecesarios. Tiene que decir, entonces, que es tan leg\u00edtimo hacer de la b\u00fasqueda de la seguridad, del dinero o de la deferencia la meta vital \u00fanica como buscar la verdad como fin principal. De este modo queda expuesto a la sospecha que su actividad como cient\u00edfico no sirva a otros fines que el incremento de su seguridad, su riqueza o su prestigio, y que su competencia no sea m\u00e1s que una habilidad que est\u00e1 dispuesto a vender al mejor postor. Los ciudadanos honestos comenzar\u00e1n a preguntarse si se puede confiar en un hombre as\u00ed o si este hombre puede ser leal, especialmente despu\u00e9s de haber sostenido que es tan defendible elegir la lealtad como valor propio as\u00ed como rechazarla. En una palabra, se habr\u00e1 enredado en el trance que condujo a Tras\u00edmaco a su ca\u00edda, abatido por S\u00f3crates, en el primer libro de <\/span>La <\/i><\/span>R<\/i><\/span>ep\u00fablica<\/i><\/span>, de Plat\u00f3n.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Siguiente p\u00e1rrafo<\/a><\/p>\n P\u00e1rrafo anterior<\/a><\/p>\n Ir al inicio de esta entrada<\/a><\/p>\nLe<\/span>\u014d<\/span>nard<\/span>\u012b<\/span> Str\u016bt<\/span>h<\/span>i\u014dnis<\/span> verba<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n
Hisp<\/span>\u0101<\/span>nice<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n
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