\u00bfQu\u00e9 es la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica? \/ I. El problema de la Filosof\u00eda Pol\u00edtica<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Por Le\u014dnardus Str\u016bthi\u014d<\/span><\/p>\n\n T<\/span>he rejection of political philosophy as unscientific is characteristic of present-day positivism. Positivism is no longer what it desired to be when Auguste Comte<\/a> originated it. It still agrees with Comte by maintaining that modern science is the highest form of knowledge, precisely because it aims no longer, as theology and metaphysics did, at absolute knowledge of the Why, but only at relative knowledge of the How. But after having been modified by utilitarianism<\/a>, evolutionism, and neo-Kantianism<\/a>, it has abandoncd completely Comte\u2019<\/span>s<\/span> hope that a social science mo<\/span>deled<\/span> on modern natural science would be able to overcome the intellectual anarchy of modern society. In about the last decade of the 19th century, social science positivism reached its final form by realizing or decreeing that there is a fundamental difference between facts and values, and that only factual judgments are within the co<\/span>m<\/span>petence of science: scientific social science is incompetent to pronounce value judgments, and must avoid value judgments altogether. As for the meaning of the term \u201cvalue\u201d in statements of this kind, we can hardly say more than that \u201cvalues\u201d mean both things preferred and principles of preference.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Next paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n Previous paragraph<\/a><\/p>\n El rechazo de la <\/span>filosof\u00eda pol\u00edtica <\/span>al <\/span>considerada<\/span> doctrina <\/span>acient\u00edfica <\/span>es caracter\u00edstica del positivismo<\/a> de <\/span>nuestros d\u00edas<\/span>. El positivismo no es ya lo que pretend\u00eda ser cuando August<\/span>e<\/span> Comte<\/a> lo fund\u00f3. A\u00fan <\/span>est\u00e1 de acuerdo con <\/span>Comte, al considerar que la ciencia moderna es la expresi\u00f3n m\u00e1s elevada del conocimiento porque <\/span>ya <\/span>no busca, como la teolog\u00eda y la metaf\u00edsica lo hicieron, el conocimiento absoluto del <\/span>P<\/span>orqu\u00e9, sino s\u00f3lo el conocimiento relativo del <\/span>C<\/span>\u00f3mo. Pero despu\u00e9s de ser <\/span>haber sido modificado por <\/span>utilitarismo,<\/a> el evolucionismo<\/a> y el neokantismo<\/a>, el positivismo ha abandonado enteramente la esperanza de Comte de que una ciencia social al estilo de las modernas ciencias naturales pudiera superar la anarqu\u00eda intelectual de la sociedad moderna. Hacia la \u00faltima d\u00e9cada del siglo <\/span>XIX<\/span>, la ciencia social positivista alcanz\u00f3 su desarrollo final al darse cuenta de que existe una separaci\u00f3n radical entre los hechos y los valores, y s\u00f3lo los juicios sobre los hechos entran dentro del campo de la ciencia. Las ciencias sociales <\/span>\u00ab<\/span>cient\u00edficas<\/span>\u00bb<\/span> est\u00e1n incapacitadas para emitir<\/span> juicios de valor y tienen que huir de ellos <\/span>por completo<\/span>. En cuanto al significado de la palabra <\/span>\u00ab<\/span>valor<\/span>\u00bb<\/span> en afirmaciones como las precedentes, dif\u00edcilmente podr\u00edamos decir m\u00e1s que esos <\/span>\u00ab<\/span>valores<\/span>\u00bb<\/span> significan, al mismo tiempo, objetos preferidos y principios de preferencia.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Siguiente p\u00e1rrafo<\/a><\/p>\n P\u00e1rrafo anterior<\/a><\/p>\n Ir al inicio de esta entrada<\/a><\/p>\nLe<\/span>\u014d<\/span>nard<\/span>\u012b<\/span> Str\u016bt<\/span>h<\/span>i\u014dnis<\/span> verba<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n
Hisp<\/span>\u0101<\/span>nice<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n
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