Ethica Nicomachea L-II 014
Ēthica Nicōmachea sīve Dē mōribus ad Nicōmachum (Aristotelēs)
Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια (Ἀριστοτέλης)
OFFICĪNA PHILOSOPHŌRVM ***
(1106a-1106b)
Parte de:
Ética Nicomáquea / Libro II / [6. Naturaleza del modo de ser]
Tabla de contenidos
Ēthica Nicōmachea L-II 014
Πῶς δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι [25] δὲ καὶ ὧδ᾽ ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ᾽ ἔλαττον τὸ δ᾽ ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ᾽ ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος [30] μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐχ ἕν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν. οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἓξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ [35] ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· [1106b] [1] οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἓξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολύ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ [5] πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ᾽ αἱρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
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Ética Nicomáquea L-II 014
Si esto es así en todos los casos, la virtud del hombre será también el modo de ser por el cual el hombre se hace bueno y por el cual realiza bien su función propia. Cómo esto es así, se ha dicho ya; pero se hará más evidente, si consideramos cuál es la naturaleza de la virtud. En todo lo continuo y divisible es posible tomar una cantidad mayor, o menor, o igual, y esto, o bien con relación a la cosa misma, o a nosotros; y lo igual es un término medio entre el exceso y el defecto. Llamo término medio de una cosa al que dista lo mismo de ambos extremos, y éste es uno y el mismo para todos; y en relación con nosotros, al que ni excede ni se queda corto, y éste no es ni uno ni el mismo para todos. Por ejemplo, si diez es mucho y dos es poco, se toma el seis como término medio en cuanto a la cosa, pues excede y es excedido en una cantidad igual, y en esto consiste el medio según la proporción aritmética. Pero el medio relativo a nosotros, [1106b] no ha de tomarse de la misma manera, pues si para uno es mucho comer diez minas de alimentos, y poco comer dos, el entrenador no prescribirá seis minas, pues probablemente esa cantidad será mucho o poco para el que ha de tomarla: para Milón,1Milón de Crotona, atleta del siglo VI a.C., vencedor varias veces de los Juegos Olímpicos y famoso por su fuerza extraordinaria. La mina, como unidad de peso, equivalía a unos 436 grs. poco; para el que se inicia en los ejercicios corporales, mucho. Así pues, todo conocedor evita el exceso y el defecto, y busca el término medio y lo prefiere; pero no el término medio de la cosa, sino el relativo a nosotros.
Nicomachean Ethics L-II 014
If therefore this is true of all things, excellence or virtue in a man will be the disposition which renders him a good man and also which will cause him to perform his function well. We have already indicated what this means; but it will throw more light on the subject if we consider what constitutes the specific nature of virtue. Now of everything that is continuous2i.e., without distinct parts, and so (if divisible at all), divisible at any point, as opposed to what is διῃρημένον, ‘discrete,’ or made up of distinct parts and only divisible between them. and divisible, it is possible to take the larger part, or the smaller part, or an equal part, and these parts may be larger, smaller, and equal either with respect to the thing itself or relatively to us; the equal part being a mean between excess and deficiency.3See note below. By the mean of the thing I denote a point equally distant from either extreme, which is one and the same for everybody; by the mean relative to us, that amount which is neither too much nor too little, and this is not one and the same for everybody. For example, let 10 be many and 2 few; then one takes the mean with respect to the thing if one takes 6; since 6 – 2 = 10 – 6, and this is the mean according to arithmetical proportion.4We should rather call this an arithmetical progression. But we cannot arrive by this method at the mean relative to us. [1106b] Suppose that 10 lb. of food is a large ration for anybody and 2 lb. a small one: it does not follow that a trainer will prescribe 6 lb., for perhaps even this will be a large ration, or a small one, for the particular athlete who is to receive it; it is a small ration for a Milo,5A famous wrestler. but a large one for a man just beginning to go in for athletics. And similarly with the amount of running or wrestling exercise to be taken. In the same way then an expert in any art avoids excess and deficiency, and seeks and adopts the mean—the mean that is not of the thing but relative to us.
Some clarifications
Greek comparatives, ‘larger’, ‘smaller’, etc., may also mean ‘too large’, ‘too small’, etc.; and there is the same ambiguity in the words translated ‘excess’ and ‘deficiency’. Again μέσον, ‘middle’ or ‘mean’, is used as a synonym for μέτριον ‘moderate’ or of the right amount, and ἴσον ‘equal’ can mean ‘equitable’. Hence ‘to take an equal part with respect to the thing itself’ means to take a part equal to the part left, viz. a half; ‘to take an equal part relatively to us,’ means to take what is a fair or suitable amount. The former is a mean as being exactly in the middle between all and none—if the thing in question is represented by a line, this is bisected at a point equidistant from its two ends; the latter is a mean in the sense of being the right amount for the recipient, and also of lying somewhere between any two other amounts that happen to be too much and too little for him.
Ad Nicomachum filium de Moribus L-II 014
Quod si ita est in omnibus, certe hominis virtūs habitus erit, quo & bonus homō efficitur, & officio suo ac munere probe fungitur. Hoc quemadmodum futurum sit, & iam diximus, & nunc ita denique perspici poterit, si qualis qualis eius sit natura, etiam atque etiam considerabimus. Licet quidem in omni natura cohaerente & continuata, quaeque secari potest & dividi, & quod praestat, notare, & quod superatur, & quod aequale est: idque vel pro reī natura vel nostro more. Aequale autem dīcitur id, quod medium est inter rem quae praestat, & eam quae vincitur. Reī autem medium appello id, quod aeque abest ab utraque extremitate: idque apud omnes unum idemque valet & efficit. Nostra autem ratiōne id medium est, quod nec transit modum nec deserit, nec unum idemque apud omnes valet. Ut si decem nimium multa sunt, duo nōn satis, capiant sex pro reī medio. Eaque enim superant atque superantur. Hoc autem medium a proportione arithmetica ducitur. At quod nobis medium est, nōn ita sumitur. Nōn enim si cui decem minas edere nimium sit, duas parum, sex minas magister ludi praescripserit. Est enim hoc fortasse nimium vel parum ei quī capiat, ut Milioni parum, tironi nimium. Eadem est & cursus ratiō & luctae.
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