Ethica Nicomachea L-II 021
Ēthica Nicōmachea sīve Dē mōribus ad Nicōmachum (Aristotelēs)
Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια (Ἀριστοτέλης)
OFFICĪNA PHILOSOPHŌRVM ***
(1108a)
Parte de:
Ética Nicomáquea / Libro II / [7. Ejemplos de virtudes como término medio entre un exceso y un defecto]
Tabla de contenidos
Ēthica Nicōmachea L-II 021
Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μέν [10] τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ᾽ ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἣ μέν ἐστι περὶ τἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἳ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα [15] μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ᾽ ἄκρα οὔτ᾽ ἐπαινετὰ οὔτ᾽ ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ᾽, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς [20] ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων <ὁ ἔχων>. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δ᾽ ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία [25] καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ᾽ ἐλλείπων ἄγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἄρεσκος, εἰ δ᾽ ὠφελείας τῆς αὑτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ᾽ ἐλλείπων [30] καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος.
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Ética Nicomáquea L-II 021
Hay, además, otras tres disposiciones intermedias que tienen alguna semejanza entre sí, pero son diferentes; todas se refieren a la comunicación por medio de palabras y acciones, pero difieren en que una de ellas se refiere a la verdad en su ámbito, y las otras dos a lo que es agradable, ya en el juego ya en todas las otras circunstancias de la vida. Así debemos considerarlas también, a fin de comprender mejor que el término medio es laudable en todas las cosas, mientras que los extremos no son ni rectos ni laudables, sino reprensibles. La mayoría de estas disposiciones también carecen de nombres, pero debemos intentar, como en los demás casos, introducir nombres nosotros mismos para mayor claridad y para que se nos siga fácilmente.
Así pues, con respecto a la verdad, llamemos veraz al que posee el medio, y veracidad a la disposición intermedia; en cuanto a la pretensión, la exagerada, fanfarronería, y al que la tiene, fanfarrón; la que se subestima, disimulo, y disimulador, al que la tiene. Respecto del que se complace en divertir a los otros, el término medio es gracioso, y la disposición, gracia; el exceso, bufonería, y el que la tiene, bufón; y el deficiente, rústico, y su disposición, rusticidad. En cuanto al agrado en las restantes cosas de la vida, el que es agradable como se debe es amable, y la disposición intermedia, amabilidad; el excesivo, si no tiene mira alguna, obsequioso, si es por utilidad, adulador, y el deficiente y en todo desagradable, quisquilloso y malhumorado.
Nicomachean Ethics L-II 021
There are also three other modes of observing a mean which bear some resemblance to each other, and yet are different; all have to do with intercourse in conversation and action, but they differ in that one is concerned with truthfulness of speech and behaviour, and the other with pleasantness, in its two divisions of pleasantness in social amusement and pleasantness in the general affairs of life. We must then discuss these qualities also, in order the better to discern that in all things the observance of the mean is to be praised, while the extremes are neither right nor praiseworthy, but reprehensible. Most of these qualities also are unnamed, but in these as in the other cases we must attempt to coin names for them ourselves, for the sake of clearness and so that our meaning may be easily followed.
In respect of truth then, the middle character may be called truthful, and the observance of the mean Truthfulness;1See note below. pretence in the form of exaggeration is Boastfulness, and its possessor a boaster; in the form of understatement, Self-depreciation, and its possessor the self-depreciator. In respect of pleasantness and social amusement, the middle character is witty and the middle disposition Wittiness; the excess is Buffoonery and its possessor a buffoon; the deficient man may be called boorish, and his disposition Boorishness. In respect of general pleasantness in life, the man who is pleasant in the proper manner is friendly, and the observance of the mean is Friendliness; he that exceeds, if from no interested motive, is obsequious, if for his own advantage, a flatterer; he that is deficient, and unpleasant in all the affairs of life, may be called quarrelsome and surly.
Some clarifications
On the word “truthfulnes”
From Bk. 4.7 it appears that the quality intended is sincerity of speech and conduct in the matter of asserting one’s own merits. The observance of the mean in this respect is there said to have no name; and here the form of expression apologizes for using ‘Truthfulness’ in so limited a sense. The defect in this respect Aristotle expresses by εἰρωνεία, a word specially associated with the affectation of ignorance practised by Socrates. Neither this nor its other shades of meaning correspond very closely to that of its English derivative irony.
Ad Nicomachum filium de Moribus L-II 021
Sunt etiam tres aliae mediocritātēs, finitimae omnino, sed tamen inter sē differunt aliquid. Nam cum in sermonum actionumque societate versentur, hoc tamen differunt, quo una in veritate, aliae duae in vitae iucunditate cernuntur. Atque huius quidem iucunditatis pars altera ludis tribuitur, altera omnibus rēbus iis quae vitam attingunt humanam. Quamobrem de his etiam nobis dīcendum est, quo facilius in omnibus fere rēbus mediocritātem esse laudābilem perspiciamus, & extrema, nec recta nec laudanda, quīn etiam vituperanda. Et quanquam permulta sint eōrum vacantia nomine, tamen danda opera est, ut ïīs sicut aliis nōmina imponamus, quo & rēs dilucidior sit, & nōs facilius cōnsentānea dicamus. Igitur in veritate quī modum adhibet, verax, & habitus veritas dīcitur. Simulatio si in maius progrediatur, arrogantia: & quī eam habet, arrogāns: sin sua nimium extenuet, ipsa affectio dissimulationis: & quī ea praeditus est, dissimulatoris nomine, & crimine notandus. In iucunditate porro quae ad lusum accommodātur, quī modum quendam adhibet, is cōmis, seu urbanus habendus est, & affectio comitas & urbanitas: at quae modum egreditur, scurrīlitās, & in quo ipsa inest, scurra dīcitur. Quī vero omnino a ludo abhorret, is agrestis & rusticus: affectio ipsa rusticitas habenda est. Quod autem attinet ad reliquam iucunditatem eam quae in vita adhibetur, quī ita sē iucundum praebet, ut ratiō postulat, is facilis, & mediocritās, facilitas dīcitur. Quī modum egreditur, si nulla causa ductus, affabilis: sin emolumeti sui causa, affentator habendus est. At quī omnino abhorret disceditque a modo & ratiōne, sedque tristem rēbus omnibus praebet, is morosus & difficilis putandus est.
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